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ARTICLES
Government as Educator: A New Understanding of
First Amendment Protection of Academic Freedom
and Governance
JUDITH AREEN*
“[O]nly scholars can pass judgment on scholars as such . . . .”
–Immanuel Kant1
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More than fifty years have passed since Chief Justice Earl Warren pro-
nounced the value of academic freedom “self-evident,” and warned that “[t]o
impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and
universities would imperil the future of our Nation.”2 Within a decade, a
majority of the Supreme Court had declared academic freedom “a special
concern of the First Amendment.”3 Despite this auspicious beginning, the Court
has not developed a coherent theory to guide constitutional protection of
academic freedom, and recently, in Garcetti v. Ceballos,4 it placed the protec-
tion, itself, in doubt.
In Garcetti, a closely divided Court rejected the free-expression claim of a
state prosecutor on the ground that statements made pursuant to the “profes-
sional duties” of public employees are not shielded from employer discipline.5
Justice Souter, in a dissent joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, warned that
the decision could “imperil First Amendment protection of academic freedom in
public colleges and universities, whose teachers necessarily speak and write
‘pursuant to official duties.’”6 In response, the majority agreed to leave unde-
2. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion).
3. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
4. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
5. Id. at 426.
6. Id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
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cided for now whether Garcetti signals the end of constitutional protection for
academic freedom.7
This Article responds to the invitation in Garcetti to identify constitutional
interests that support academic freedom and that are not fully accounted for by
public-employee speech jurisprudence. It first argues that, contrary to common
understanding, academic freedom is about much more than faculty speech—
more than simply the university professor’s analog to the citizen’s right of free
speech. Rather, academic freedom is central to the functioning and governance
of colleges and universities. Louis Menand recognized this broader role when
he called academic freedom a “key legitimating concept” of academic life, one
that explains a wide array of issues, from why departments have the authority to
hire and fire their own members to why the football coach is not allowed to
influence the quarterback’s grade in a course.8 Academic freedom, properly
understood, has what I will call a “governance dimension.” It is not only about
faculty research and teaching; it is also about the freedom of faculties to govern
their institutions in a way that accords with academic values whether they are
approving the curriculum, hiring faculty, or establishing graduation require-
ments for students.
The governance dimension of academic freedom has been overlooked by
most legal scholars who have written on the First Amendment’s application to
academic freedom,9 or reduced to a right that belongs only to the governing
7. Id. at 425 (“We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we conduct today
would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.”).
8. Louis Menand, The Limits of Academic Freedom, in THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 3, 4
(Louis Menand ed., 1996).
9. See, e.g., Alan K. Chen, Bureaucracy and Distrust: Germaneness and the Paradoxes of the
Academic Freedom Doctrine, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 955 (2006); Rebecca Gose Lynch, Pawns of the State
or Priests of Democracy? Analyzing Professors’ Academic Freedom Rights Within the State’s Manage-
rial Realm, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1061 (2003); Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of
Managerial Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (2008); Larry D. Spurgeon, A Transcendent Value:
The Quest To Safeguard Academic Freedom, 34 J.C. & U.L. 111 (2007); William W. Van Alstyne,
Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in the Supreme Court of the United States: An Unhurried
Historical Review, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 79. Walter Metzger criticized the
American Association of University Professors (AAUP) for failing to insist that faculty be put in charge
of their colleges and universities, but overlooked the Declaration’s embrace of shared governance.
Walter Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in America, 66
TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1276–77 (1988).
Professor David Rabban is one of the few scholars to mention the governance dimension of academic
freedom, but he did not otherwise analyze its role. See David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of
“Individual” and “Institutional” Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1990, at 227, 295 (“Claims of administrative abuse of the peer review process and
disagreements over curricular and other educational policy issues seem sufficiently linked to critical
inquiry to come within the specific theory of academic freedom.”); see also WILLIAM A. KAPLIN &
BARBARA A. LEE, 1 THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION 663, 666 (4th ed. 2006) (“[A faculty claim] may
properly be characterized as an academic freedom claim . . . if the opinions and ideas that the faculty
member expresses implicate the academic operations of a program, department, or school.”); Neal
Kumar Katyal, The Promise and Precondition of Educational Autonomy, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 557,
566 (2003) (“If educational autonomy becomes a license for university administrators to admit who
they want when they want without faculty oversight, it’s not part of academic freedom at all.”).
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board or administration of a college or university.10 Debate over whether
academic freedom is an individual or an institutional right has claimed a
disproportionate share of the scholarly literature, yet for the most part that
literature has failed to consider whether faculty involvement in an academic
governance decision should affect the level of constitutional protection provided
for that decision.11 This Article reclaims the broader understanding of academic
freedom from analytic neglect and uses it to recast the relationship between
academic freedom and the First Amendment.
Part I argues that academic freedom encompasses more than research and
teaching; it has a governance dimension. It traces the emergence of this robust
conception of academic freedom as a professional standard for free thought in
the classroom and laboratory, as well as for academic governance by faculties,
to 1915 when the American Association of University Professors (AAUP)
credited the German ideal of academic freedom as the inspiration for its
Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure.12 Part II
examines the development of constitutional protection for academic freedom at
public colleges and universities. It documents how the constitutional understand-
ing of academic freedom has been compromised by its failure to encompass
governance as at the heart of the ideal. Part III uses the broad understanding of
academic freedom to reconceptualize academic freedom within the First Amend-
ment. It concludes that if we are to protect successfully a robust conception of
academic freedom, it is necessary to identify academic freedom as inherent in
one of the government’s many functions or roles: that of government-as-
educator. Because constitutional academic freedom was never justified as a
benefit for faculty, but for its value to the First Amendment and to the nation,
there is no good basis for carving out an exception to Garcetti for faculty. There
are compelling reasons, however, to develop a jurisprudence for the role of
government-as-educator, and to distinguish that role from the role of either
government-as-sovereign or government-as-employer. Because of the distinc-
10. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the First Amendment,” 99
YALE L.J. 251, 311 (1989) (“In the last decade, the Supreme Court’s decisions concerning academic
freedom have protected principally and expressly a First Amendment right of the university itself—
understood in its corporate capacity—largely to be free from government interference in the perfor-
mance of core educational functions.”).
11. Compare id., with Rabban, supra note 9, at 230 (“I disagree [with Byrne]. Courts may have been
presented with more institutional claims than individual claims of academic freedom, but they have also
recognized that the [F]irst [A]mendment protects individual academic freedom.”). Courts also have
disagreed about whether academic freedom is an institutional right only. Compare Urofsky v. Gilmore,
216 F.3d 401, 410 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[Academic freedom] inheres in the University, not in
individual professors . . . .”), with Piarowsky v. Ill. Cmty. Coll. Dist. 515, 759 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir.
1985) (“[Academic freedom] is used to denote both the freedom of the academy to pursue its ends
without interference from the government . . . and the freedom of the individual teacher . . . to pursue
his ends without interference from the academy . . . .”).
12. See Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, The A.A.U.P.’s “General Declaration of Principles,” 1915,
in 2 AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 860, 860 (Richard Hofstadter & Wilson
Smith eds., 1961) [hereinafter 1915 Declaration].
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tive nature of the academic workplace, constitutional academic freedom should
protect not only a professor’s speech, but also her power, as a member of a
governing faculty, to be the architect of a place of study and learning that can
facilitate the core university tasks of producing and disseminating new knowl-
edge.
I. THE PROFESSIONAL STANDARD OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
A. THE CHALLENGE POSED TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM BY LAY GOVERNING BOARDS
1. Modern Academic Freedom and the Kantian University
Academic freedom has roots that have been traced back to the thirteenth
century when universities sought freedom from both Church and State by
playing one off against the other in pursuit of more institutional autonomy.13
The institutional autonomy achieved in medieval times, however, provided little
freedom of inquiry for individual scholars.14 That modern understanding of
academic freedom did not emerge until the late-eighteenth century inspired in
large part by the ideas of Kant and other scholars of the period.15 Kant
addressed the relationship between universities and the State in The Conflict of
the Faculties,16 a work that was largely overlooked in the United States until the
late twentieth century.17 That he wrote in a deliberately oblique way should not
13. See, e.g., 1 HASTINGS RASHDALL, THE UNIVERSITIES OF EUROPE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 334–38 (F.M.
Powicke & A.B. Emden eds., 1936) (1895). Rashdall describes events at the University of Paris, from
1228 to 1229, that began with a tavern brawl involving students. The local government, in response,
sent in a company of soldiers. When several students were killed, the faculty suspended lectures in
protest and threatened to disperse unless appropriate redress was taken. A number of the faculty did go
to Oxford and Cambridge. The threat worked; the papal legate who had advised the fatal attack was
recalled, and Pope Gregory IX issued an order to the King and Queen-Mother directing them to punish
the offenders. A series of papal bulls followed that increased the authority of the university. It was
authorized, for example, to make its own rules and to punish violators by expulsion. Limits were placed
on the authority of the local bishop and on the chancellors of the university to punish students. Id. See
generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER & WALTER P. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE
UNITED STATES 3–77 (1955).
14. HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 13, at 17 (“The medieval model of inquiry was limited by
the presence of a hard core of accepted doctrine, authoritatively established, which was defined and
enforced, made obligatory on all thinkers at the risk not only of their worldly position but of their
spiritual privileges and possibly even their eternal souls.”).
15. Kant, Schelling, Fichte, Schleiermacher, and Humboldt developed the ideal of academic freedom
in reaction to Prussian censorship. FRITZ K. RINGER, THE DECLINE OF THE GERMAN MANDARINS: THE
GERMAN ACADEMIC COMMUNITY, 1890–1933, at 23–24 (1969).
16. KANT, supra note 1.
17. Hoftstadter and Metzger, for example, did not discuss Kant’s work in their classic history of
academic freedom. See HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 13. Jacques Derrida described the “invisibil-
ity” of the text in the United States. Jacques Derrida, Canons and Metonymies: An Interview with
Jacques Derrida, in LOGOMACHIA: THE CONFLICT OF THE FACULTIES 195, 199 (Richard Rand ed., 1992). In
France, the text was known for its remarks on the French Revolution and “its links to [Kant’s] Religion
within the Limits of Mere Reason,” but “it was not previously read as a discourse on the university, on
the history and structure of this institution or its relationships to the state.” Id. Interest in Kant’s text
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surprise given his personal experience with royal censorship:18
Whoever it was that first hit on the notion of a university and proposed that a
public institution of this kind be established, it was not a bad idea to handle
the entire content of learning . . . by a division of labor, so that for every
branch of the sciences there would be a public teacher or professor appointed
as its trustee, and all of these together would form a kind of learned commu-
nity called a university . . . . The university would have a certain autonomy
(since only scholars can pass judgment on scholars as such), and accordingly
it would be authorized to perform certain functions through its faculties . . . :
to admit . . . students . . . and, having conducted examinations, by its own
authority to grant degrees . . . .”19
The views of Kant and other academics also guided the founding of the
University of Berlin in 1810—the first university dedicated to research as well
as to teaching—by liberal reformer Wilhelm von Humboldt.20 Soon, universi-
ties throughout Germany were offering lectures in which faculty reported the
results of their studies, and even students were encouraged to undertake their
own research.21
was ignited when Jacques Derrida delivered a lecture about it at the 1980 centennial of Columbia
University’s Graduate School. Id. at vii.
18. In the preface, Kant quotes from the letter he received in 1794 from Frederick William, the King
of Prussia: “Our most high person has long observed with great displeasure how you misuse your
philosophy to distort and disparage many of the cardinal and basic teaching of the Holy Scrip-
tures . . . .” KANT, supra note 1, at 11. Kant replied that he had never disparaged Christianity and that in
the future he would not speak in public on religion. Id. at 19.
19. KANT, supra note 1, at 23. Kant argued that the benefits of academic freedom extend beyond the
university:
It is absolutely essential that the learned community at the university . . . contain a faculty that
is independent of the government’s command with regard to its teaching; one that, having no
commands to give, is free to evaluate everything, and concerns itself with the interests of the
sciences, that is with truth; one in which reason is authorized to speak out publicly. For
without a faculty of this kind, the truth would not come to light (and this would be to the
government’s own detriment).
Id. at 27–29. Kant also discussed the relationship among the traditional four faculties of a university. He
praised the “lower” faculty of philosophy (today’s “arts & sciences”) for its commitment to reason over
the three so-called “higher” faculties of theology, law, and medicine, which he saw as too controlled by
the State. Id.
20. See WILLIAM CLARK, ACADEMIC CHARISMA AND THE ORIGINS OF THE RESEARCH UNIVERSITY 442–46
(2006); DANIEL FALLON, THE GERMAN UNIVERSITY: A HEROIC IDEAL IN CONFLICT WITH THE MODERN WORLD
10–31 (1980); 2 PAUL R. SWEET, WILHELM VON HUMBOLDT: A BIOGRAPHY 15, 53–71 (1980); 3 A HISTORY
OF THE UNIVERSITY IN EUROPE 4–5 (Walter Ru¨egg ed., 2004); see also GERARD DELANTY, CHALLENGING
KNOWLEDGE: THE UNIVERSITY IN THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 33 (2001) (“von Humboldt was the most
influential advocate of the Kantian idea of the university and the idea of academic freedom . . . .”).
21. 3 A HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY IN EUROPE, supra note 20, at 5–6, 21, 33. The Humboldtian
approach was heavily influenced by philosopher Friedrich Schleiermacher’s vision: “The teacher must
produce everything he says before his listeners: he must not narrate what he knows, but rather
reproduce his own way to knowledge, the action itself. The listeners should not only collect knowledge.
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2. The Origin of Lay Governing Boards
Nine institutions of higher education in the United States were founded
before the nation. Harvard, the oldest of the nine colonial colleges,22 was
closely modeled on Oxford and Cambridge with one significant difference: the
governance system. Because there were not enough scholars in Massachusetts
Bay Colony to reproduce the English system of faculty governance, the colo-
nists established a lay (in the sense of nonfaculty) governing board.23 This new
form of academic governance was adopted, in turn, by the other colonial
colleges,24 and it remains the most common form of university and college
governance in the United States.25
They should directly observe the activity of intelligence producing knowledge and, by observing it,
learn how to do it themselves.” Id. at 21.
22. The nine colonial colleges were: Harvard (1636), William & Mary (1693), Collegiate School at
New Haven (Yale) (1701), College of Philadelphia (University of Pennsylvania) (1740), College of
New Jersey (Princeton) (1746), King’s College (Columbia) (1754), College of Rhode Island (Brown)
(1764), Queen’s College (Rutgers) (1766), and Dartmouth (1769). THE HISTORY OF HIGHER EDUCATION,
at xxvii (Lester F. Goodchild & Harold S. Wechsler eds., 2d ed. Pearson Custom Publ’g 1997) (1989).
23. See 1 AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 3 (Richard Hofstadter & Wilson
Smith eds., 1961) (“The European universities had been founded by groups of mature scholars; the
American colleges were founded by their communities; and since they did not soon develop the mature
scholars possessed from the beginning by their European predecessors but were staffed instead for
generations mainly by young and transient tutors, the community leaders were reluctant to drop their
reins of control.”).
The new governance structure was not accepted without struggle and was complicated by the fact
that Harvard had two governing boards. In 1721, after there had been for some time only one faculty
member on the five-person Corporation (the primary governing board at Harvard), two faculty
members petitioned the Overseers (the other governing board) for seats on the Corporation. The
controversy dragged on for several years until the Governor of Massachusetts sided with the Corpora-
tion against the faculty. When a similar protest arose in the early nineteenth century, the Overseers
voted that faculty members did not have a right to be members of the Corporation, and the question has
not been revisited since. A. LAWRENCE LOWELL, The Relation Between Faculties and Governing Boards,
in AT WAR WITH ACADEMIC TRADITIONS IN AMERICA 281, 283–85 (1934).
24. See HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 13, at 134–51. At William & Mary, as at Harvard, there
were struggles over governance by a lay board. In 1779, when Thomas Jefferson was governor of
Virginia and, therefore, ex officio head of the Board of Visitors of William & Mary (the college’s lay
governing board), the Board voted to modernize the curriculum. As part of their reform, the Latin
professor was dismissed. When he sued, the college hired the young John Marshall as its lawyer.
Marshall won the case by arguing that, because the college was private, the Board was free to operate
as it thought best as long as it complied with the college’s charter—an argument that prefigured the
position Marshall later adopted as Chief Justice in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). See Bracken v. Visitors of William & Mary Coll., 7 Va. (3 Call) 573 (1790).
25. See Ass’n of Governing Bds. of Univs. & Colls. (AGB), AGB Statement on Institutional
Governance, in AGB STATEMENT ON INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE AND GOVERNING IN THE PUBLIC TRUST:
EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 1, 2 (2003) [hereinafter AGB Statement] (“[T]he
presence of lay governing boards is what distinguishes American higher education from most of the rest
of the world . . . .”). In contrast, Oxford has kept a faculty-governance structure that has changed little
in more than seven centuries. A twenty-six-member Council sets policy for the University on many
matters, but final responsibility rests with Congregation, a body that includes some 4,000 members of
the academic, senior research, library, museum, and administrative staffs. News: Next Steps for Oxford
Governance, http://www.admin.ox.ac.uk/po/051212.shtml (last visited Jan. 4, 2008). A White Paper,
published in May 2006, proposed significant changes that would have resulted in a governing structure
similar to that of an American university. The proposals were strongly supported by the Vice-
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Lay governing boards worked well enough when most colleges were small
and sectarian. Faculty were hired simply to teach, and their teaching was limited
to a narrow curriculum that used scripture and the classics to further religious
ends.26 Henry Adams summed up the experience of many when he complained
that, during his years as a student at Harvard in the 1850s, the college “taught
little, and that little ill.”27
In the early years of the nation, most faculty members were limited to
diffusing already accepted knowledge.28 By the late-nineteenth century, how-
ever, with science taking the place of religious instruction in a growing number
of colleges and universities, and faculty performing original research and
developing scholarly expertise in a variety of disciplines,29 faculty members
Chancellor, the chief executive officer of the university. According to the White Paper, the Council was
to be reduced in size from twenty-six to fifteen members. The new board would have had seven internal
and seven lay members and a lay chair. Id.
On November 28, 2006, a meeting of Congregation voted down the proposed change in governance,
730 to 456. The Vice-Chancellor elected to take the matter to all of Congregation in December by
postal ballot. Report of Proceedings in Congregation, 28 November 2006, OXFORD U. GAZETTE, Dec. 7,
2006, available at www.ox.ac.uk/gazette/2006-7/supps/1_4791.htm. This time, more than 2,500 mem-
bers of Congregation voted, and again the proposal was rejected when more than sixty percent of those
who voted opposed the change. Rejection on a Division of Amended Legislative Proposal Confirmed by
Postal Vote, OXFORD U. GAZETTE, Jan. 11, 2007, available at www.ox.ac.uk/gazette/2006-7/weekly/
110107/acts.htm.
26. CAROLINE WINTERER, THE CULTURE OF CLASSICISM: ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME IN AMERICAN
INTELLECTUAL LIFE 1780–1910, at 11–29 (2002). The disputes that arose typically involved the failure of
a president or faculty member to adhere to the religious doctrine of the sponsoring denomination.
Henry Dunster was doing a good job as president of Harvard, for example, when he was forced out in
1654 for opposing infant baptism. 1 SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, HARVARD COLLEGE IN THE SEVENTEENTH
CENTURY 305–14 (1936).
27. HENRY ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS 51 (Ira B. Nadel ed., 1999) (1918). The problem
was caused as much by bad pedagogy as by the curriculum as shown by the recollections of Andrew
Dickson White, later the first president of Cornell, of his time as a student at Yale in the 1850s:
The worst feature of the junior year was the fact that through two terms, during five hours
each week, “recitations” were heard by a tutor in “Olmsted’s Natural Philosophy.” The
text-book was simply repeated by rote. Not one student in fifty took the least interest in it; and
the man who could give the words of the text most glibly secured the best marks. One
exceedingly unfortunate result of this kind of instruction was that it so disgusted the class with
the whole subject, that the really excellent lectures of Professor Olmsted, illustrated by
probably the best apparatus then possessed by any American university, were voted a bore.
Almost as bad was the historical instruction given by Professor James Hadley. It consisted
simply in hearing the student repeat from memory the dates from “Pu¨tz’s Ancient History.”
How a man so gifted as Hadley could have allowed any part of his work to be so worthless, it
is hard to understand.
1 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ANDREW DICKSON WHITE 27–28 (1905).
28. 1915 Declaration, supra note 12, at 866–67.
29. The German approach to higher education, particularly its commitment to research as well as
teaching, significantly influenced the development of research universities in the United States,
beginning with the founding of Johns Hopkins in 1876. Daniel Coit Gilman, discouraged by the
criticism he received as the first president of the University of California, agreed to become the first
president of Johns Hopkins when its governing board accepted his plan to establish an American
university modeled on those in Germany. HUGH HAWKINS, PIONEER: A HISTORY OF JOHNS HOPKINS
UNIVERSITY, 1874–1889, at 15, 21–22 (Johns Hopkins Paperbacks 2002) (1960). Gilman was one of the
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began to clash with governing boards.30 One of the most publicized conflicts
arose at Stanford,31 but there were also major disputes at Wisconsin,32 Vander-
bilt,33 and the University of Pennsylvania,34 among others.
B. THE PROFESSION EXPANDS AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM TO INCLUDE SHARED
GOVERNANCE
1. The 1915 AAUP Declaration Defends Shared Governance
In 1915, largely in response to the many faculty-board conflicts, the Ameri-
can Association of University Professors (AAUP) was founded and that same
more than nine thousand Americans who studied at German universities in the nineteenth century as
were nearly all of the fifty-three members of the Hopkins faculty in 1884. CARL DIEHL, AMERICANS AND
GERMAN SCHOLARSHIP 1770–1870, at 1 (1978); CHARLES THWING, THE AMERICAN AND GERMAN UNIVER-
SITY: ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF HISTORY 43 (1928).
30. See CHRISTOPHER JENCKS & DAVID RIESMAN, THE ACADEMIC REVOLUTION 15–20 (1968); LAWRENCE
R. VEYSEY, THE EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 384–418 (1965).
31. Edward Ross was already a prominent economist when he was recruited to the Stanford faculty
in 1892. His public advocacy of free silver and opposition to the exploitation of foreign labor offended
Mrs. Leland Stanford, the sole surviving trustee of the university that she and her late husband had
founded in memory of their son, Leland, Jr. In 1897, she demanded that David Starr Jordan, then
president of Stanford, fire Professor Ross. Jordan delayed for as long as he could, but ultimately he
capitulated and, in 1900, forced Ross out. ORRIN LESLIE ELLIOTT, STANFORD UNIVERSITY: THE FIRST
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 326–78 (1937); MARY O. FURNER, ADVOCACY AND OBJECTIVITY: A CRISIS IN THE
PROFESSIONALIZATION OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE, 1865–1905, at 241–42 (1975). Donald Kennedy, a
former president of Stanford, has challenged the accuracy of this history. He reports that what triggered
Jane Stanford’s ire was a speech by Ross opposing Asian immigration in which he said, “And should
the worst come to the worst, it would be better for us if we were to turn our guns upon every vessel
bringing Japanese to our shores than to permit them to land.” The speech was made at a time when
Stanford was making special efforts to include Japanese and Chinese students in its classes. DONALD
KENNEDY, ACADEMIC DUTY 125 (1997).
32. Professor Richard Ely in 1894 was tried but ultimately acquitted by a committee of the Regents
of the University of Wisconsin for advocating strikes and boycotts. The Regents affirmed their
commitment to academic freedom in their final report and added: “Whatever may be the limitations
which trammel inquiry elsewhere, we believe that the great state University of Wisconsin should ever
encourage that continual sifting and winnowing by which alone truth can be found.” Theodore
Herfurth, Sifting and Winnowing: A Chapter in the History of Academic Freedom at the University of
Wisconsin, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM ON TRIAL: 100 YEARS OF SIFTING AND WINNOWING AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
WISCONSIN-MADISON 58, 59–67 (W. Lee Hansen ed., 1998).
33. The conflict at Vanderbilt was also one of the first American disputes over the teaching of
evolution. In 1873, Central University of Nashville, Tennessee, was renamed in recognition of a large
gift from Commodore Vanderbilt. The gift was conditioned on the university retaining an ecclesiastical
system of control by the Methodist church, under which the local bishop served as ex officio president
of the governing board. As part of his effort to increase the academic position of the school, Bishop
McTyeire hired Alexander Winchell, a respected geologist and known evolutionist. After a number of
religious journals accused Professor Winchell of attempting to destroy the truths of the Gospel,
McTyeire dismissed Winchell in 1878. HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 13, at 330–32.
34. Scott Nearing’s contract as an assistant professor at the Wharton School of the University of
Pennsylvania was not renewed in 1915. Although the trustees denied that they acted because of
Nearing’s support of legislation to limit child labor, faculty members were not persuaded. LIGHTNER
WITMER, THE NEARING CASE: THE LIMITATION ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
BY ACT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, JUNE 14, 1915, at 1–14 (1915); see also Report of the Committee of
Inquiry on the Case of Professor Scott Nearing of the University of Pennsylvania, 11 AAUP BULL. 3,
7–15 (1916).
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year issued its Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic
Tenure (the Declaration).35 Although the Declaration was not well-received
outside the profession when it first appeared,36 modern scholars consider it the
seminal statement of American academic freedom.37
Philosopher John Dewey, the first president of the Association, appointed
leading scholars to a new Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic
Tenure to draft the Declaration. The Committee, known as the Seligman Commit-
tee after its chair, Edwin Seligman, a Columbia professor of economics, in-
cluded philosopher Arthur Lovejoy of Johns Hopkins and Roscoe Pound, then
dean of the Harvard Law School.38
The Seligman Committee had a clear vision of the purpose of higher educa-
tion when it crafted the Declaration. It acknowledged that there is political
freedom in a democracy, but warned of the risk that “an overwhelming and
concentrated public opinion” could lead to “a tyranny of public opinion.”39 A
university must be a refuge from such tyranny, the Committee asserted, “an
intellectual experiment station, where new ideas may germinate and where their
fruit, though still distasteful to the community as a whole, may be allowed to
ripen until finally . . . it may become a part of the accepted intellectual food of
the nation or of the world.”40 A university also should be “the conservator of all
genuine elements of value in the past thought and life of mankind which are not
in the fashion of the moment.”41 To resist public pressure to conform to views
that are merely fashionable, a university needs academic freedom.
35. 1915 Declaration, supra note 12. Faculty members were inspired to act in part by the spirit of
Progressivism. The formation of the AAUP began with a call for a conference on establishing a national
organization that was issued by eighteen full professors at Johns Hopkins and was sent to faculties of
nine leading universities. Seven of them—Clark, Columbia, Cornell, Harvard, Princeton, Wisconsin,
and Yale—sent delegates. HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 13, at 474–77.
36. See, e.g., Editorial, The Professors’ Union, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1916, at 8 (“‘Academic
freedom,’ that is, the inalienable right of every college instructor to make a fool of himself and his
college by . . . intemperate, sensational prattle about every subject under heaven, to his classes and to
the public, and still keep on the payroll or be reft therefrom only by elaborate process, is cried to all the
winds by the organized dons . . . . It may be worth while to . . . remark that the ‘sciences’ about which
the uplift professors are apt to be most cocksure are pseudo-sciences, mere opinions. A sociologist, for
instance, cannot rightly speak with the certainty of a mathematician or a chemist . . . .”). See generally
Walter P. Metzger, The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 3, 16 (citing additional negative reviews).
37. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 10, at 276 (calling the Declaration “the single most important
document relating to American academic freedom”); Robert Post, The Structure of Academic Freedom,
in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 61, 64 (Beshara Doumani ed., 2006) (deeming the
Declaration “[t]he first systematic and arguably the greatest articulation of the logic and structure of
academic freedom in America”); Rabban, supra note 9, at 229 (referring to the Declaration as “the
seminal professional definition”).
38. 1915 Declaration, supra note 12, at 878. Lovejoy was one of seven faculty members who
resigned from Stanford when his colleague, Edward Ross, was forced out. HOFSTADTER & METZGER,
supra note 13, at 442; see supra note 31. Seligman wrote the first draft of the Declaration which was
then extensively revised by Lovejoy. THOMAS L. HASKELL, OBJECTIVITY IS NOT NEUTRALITY 184 (1998).
39. 1915 Declaration, supra note 12, at 870.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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To build support for the ideal of academic freedom, particularly among
governing board members, the Declaration explicitly connected the freedom to
the universities of Germany, then widely considered to be the best in the
world.42 The Declaration begins by explaining that academic freedom has
traditionally had two applications—to the freedom of the teacher (Lehrfreiheit)
and to that of the student (Lernfreiheit).43 Lehrfreiheit, or “freedom in teach-
ing,” was understood to protect faculty research as well as teaching.44 All
nineteenth-century German universities were governmental institutions, which
meant all faculty members were government employees. By statute, however,
academics were granted more freedom of expression than other public employ-
ees.45
The German states, through their ministries of education, exercised a fair
amount of control over their universities: they set the budgets, created new
chairs, appointed professors, and established the general scope of instruction.46
On the other hand, the faculties at the universities elected the rectors47 and
deans, appointed lecturers, and nominated scholars to be appointed to the
faculty.48 In some respects, the arrangement anticipated the shared governance
by lay boards and the faculty that characterizes American colleges and universi-
ties today.
As much as Americans wanted to emulate the academic freedom of German
universities, they were faced with a fundamental difference in governing struc-
tures: in Germany no lay boards were interposed between the government and
42. See VEYSEY, supra note 30, at 129–30.
43. Lernfreiheit, or student freedom, primarily protected the right of students to select which
university to attend and which courses to take. FRIEDRICH PAULSEN, THE GERMAN UNIVERSITIES: THEIR
CHARACTER AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 201 (photo. reprint 2007) (Edward Delavon Perry trans.,
1895). The Declaration made clear that it would only discuss Lehrfreiheit. 1915 Declaration, supra
note 12, at 861.
44. PAULSEN, supra note 43, at 170–71 (noting that Lehrfreiheit necessarily protects inquiry as well
as teaching because university students want to hear “thoughts put forward as personal convictions by a
man who has given thorough and earnest consideration to the great questions of the world and of life,”
not “officially prescribed or permitted views”).
45. See Metzger, supra note 9, at 1269 (“In its native habitat, [Lehrfreiheit] referred to the statutory
right of full and associate professors, who were salaried civil servants, to discharge their professional
duties outside the chain of command that encompassed other government officials. It allowed them to
decide on the content of their lectures and to publish the findings of their research without seeking prior
ministerial or ecclesiastical approval or fearing state or church reproof; it protected the restiveness of
academic intellect from the obedience norms of hierarchy.”).
46. ABRAHAM FLEXNER, UNIVERSITIES: AMERICAN, ENGLISH, GERMAN 316–18 (Transaction Publishers
1994) (1930); HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 13, at 385–86. Humboldt asked the king to make the
universities financially independent by giving them large grants of property. The official in charge of
education within the Ministry of the Interior at the time persuaded the king to reject this proposal by
pointing out that “however exalted the heads may be, the stomachs will always maintain their rights
against them. . . . He who rules the latter will always be able to deal with the former.” RINGER, supra
note 15, at 112.
47. The Rector, who was the head of the university, was chosen annually by, and from, the full
professors. PAULSEN, supra note 43, at 94–95.
48. HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 13, at 386; PAULSEN, supra note 43, at 93–100.
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the powers of the faculty.49 For this reason, the academic freedom that devel-
oped in Germany protected faculty only from government interference, and only
for faculty actions inside the university.50 Outside the university, German
professors, like other civil servants, were expected to be circumspect and loyal
to the government. Participation in politics was frowned upon as likely to spoil
the habits of scholarship.51
The members of the Seligman Committee addressed the difference in gover-
nance by expanding the scope of academic freedom in the United States to
protect faculty from interference by governing boards as well as from interfer-
ence by government.52 They emphasized that this expanded conception of
academic freedom did not prevent holding individual faculty members account-
able for what they said and did.53 The Declaration favors restraints that are
“self-imposed” or enforced by the “opinion” of the profession, but acknowl-
edges that there will be times when the “aberrations” of individual faculty
members require disciplinary action.54 “It is . . . not the absolute freedom of
utterance of the individual scholar, but the absolute freedom of thought, of
inquiry, of discussion and of teaching, of the academic profession, that is
asserted by this declaration of principles.”55
This crucial sentence makes clear that American academic freedom protects
both individual members of the faculty and faculty in their institutional and
disciplinary communities. Professor Walter Metzger has identified these overlap-
ping functions as the “double lives” of faculty. All faculty members belong
simultaneously to a “profession-across-the-disciplines” when they function as
part of a deliberative faculty body in a particular institution with primary
authority over such academic matters as curriculum and admissions, and to a
49. PAULSEN, supra note 43, at 93–97.
50. Faculty were protected from government intervention both individually and as a body. Id.
51. HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 13, at 389.
52. 1915 Declaration, supra note 12, at 863 (“Trustees . . . have no moral right to bind the reason or
conscience of any professor. All claim to such right is waived by the appeal to the general public for
contributions and for moral support in the maintenance, not of a propaganda, but of a non-partisan
institution of learning. . . . [T]he public should be advised that [any institution that restricts the
intellectual freedom of its professors] has no claim whatever to general support or regard.”).
One of the most quoted sections of the Declaration is its assertion that academic freedom has three
parts: freedom of inquiry and research, freedom of teaching, and freedom of extramural utterance and
action. Id. at 861. What has been overlooked, however, is that the Declaration qualifies this definition
by saying that it is there defining only the freedom of the teacher, not all of academic freedom. Id.
53. Scholars’ conclusions must be “gained by a scholar’s method and held in a scholar’s spirit.” Id.
at 871. A scholar’s conclusions also must be “the fruits of competent and patient and sincere inquiry,”
and set forth with “dignity, courtesy, and temperateness of language.” Id.
The Declaration places even greater limits on the teaching freedom of faculty. Students are not to be
indoctrinated; they are to be educated to think for themselves. Id. at 871. With immature students, the
Declaration establishes even more stringent limits. Faculty must guard against “taking unfair advantage
of the student’s immaturity by indoctrinating him with the teacher’s own opinions before the student
has had an opportunity fairly to examine other opinions upon the matters in question.” Id. at 873.
54. Id. at 875.
55. Id.
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“profession-in-a-discipline” that links them to scholars in the same discipline at
their own and other institutions.56
The Declaration’s recognition that the academic freedom of the profession
trumps that of individual scholars provides a way to resolve many internal
disputes in colleges and universities. Because it is the faculty as a body that is
given primary responsibility over academic matters, when there is a conflict
between an individual faculty member and her faculty over an institutional
academic matter, the claim of the individual member of the faculty normally
should yield.57 Individual faculty members remain free to decide what problems
they will research, and how they will report their findings, although the need to
demonstrate their fitness for tenure to their faculty colleagues places some
constraints on the scholarly freedom of untenured faculty. Once tenure is
achieved, individual faculty members have extremely broad freedom as to their
research, subject only to the risk of being dismissed if their peers agree after a
full hearing that they have met one of the grounds for dismissal at their
institution. Individual faculty members have somewhat less freedom with re-
spect to their teaching, as the authority to decide such institutional academic
matters as what courses will be taught and what grading standards are to be
followed is vested in the faculty as a body.58
Protecting faculty members from trustees is a more complex task than
protecting them from government interference because boards and the adminis-
trators they appoint are inside the university. Mere adoption by a governing
board of a policy of academic freedom might accomplish little, therefore, if the
board were given sole power to decide what courses will be offered or who will
teach them. The Seligman Committee’s solution was to give faculties primary
responsibility for academic matters:
56. Metzger, supra note 9, at 1267; see also HASKELL, supra note 38, at 175 (noting that the
scholarly disciplines are “communities of the competent” around which the modern university was
formed, and further commenting that “[d]efending their authority is . . . what academic freedom is
principally about”).
57. The Supreme Court has held that an academic decision made by the faculty as a body may be
challenged, but only if the decision is “such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to
demonstrate that the faculty did not exercise professional judgment.” Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v.
Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 227 (1985).
Many courts, unfortunately, have not acknowledged the importance of the role of the faculty as a
body when internal disputes are litigated. Some have held, for example, that it is the administration
rather than the faculty as a body that has the authority to decide which courses are to be taught. See,
e.g., Scallet v. Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999, 1017 n.18 (W.D. Va. 1996) (“[I]f school administrators
believe, as they apparently do, that a required first-year class on business ethics is the most appropriate
forum in which to teach issues of diversity, they are entitled to make that judgment . . . .”), aff’d, 106
F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 1997). Other courts have held that the institution rather than the faculty as a body has
the authority to set the grading curve. See, e.g., Lovelace v. Se. Mass. Univ., 793 F.2d 419, 426 (1st Cir.
1986) (“[M]atters such as course content, homework load, and grading policy are core university
concerns . . . .”).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 53–57.
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A university is a great and indispensable organ of the higher life of a civilized
community, in the work of which the trustees hold an essential and highly
honorable place, but in which the faculties hold an independent place, with
quite equal responsibilities—and in relation to purely scientific and educa-
tional questions, the primary responsibility.59
The Declaration justifies this shared governance role for faculties and boards
on the pragmatic ground that it is the best way for a university to promote
“[g]enuine boldness and thoroughness of inquiry.”60 If trustees have authority to
decide what is taught and written, by contrast, whether it be the advantages of a
protective tariff or the doctrines of socialism, the institution will be more an
“instrument of propaganda” than a true university.61
Allocating primary responsibility for the governance of academic functions
of a university to the faculty also reduces the risk that the research or teaching
of individual faculty members will be shaped or restricted by “inexpert and
possibly not wholly disinterested persons outside their ranks,” whether it be the
lay board or the administration.62 It makes no more sense for the lay members
of a governing board to supersede the authority of faculties over academic
matters than for the lay board members of an opera company to take responsibil-
ity for casting the major roles, or for those of a hospital to hire the surgeons.
To bolster the argument for limiting the power of lay boards over academic
matters, the Declaration quotes Charles Eliot, who had completed forty years as
president of Harvard and was one of the most admired academic leaders of his
generation:
“In the institutions of higher education the board of trustees is the body on
whose discretion, good feeling, and experience the securing of academic
59. 1915 Declaration, supra note 12, at 866.
60. Id. at 862. The Seligman Committee did not invent shared government. There had been faculty
participation in governance of academic matters at some colleges and universities in the United States
for nearly a century before the committee was formed. Jerimiah Day, for example, who served as
president of Yale from 1817 to 1846, adopted the practice of discussing and deciding all questions
connected with college policy in meetings of the faculty. HOFSTADTER AND METZGER, supra note 13, at
235. In 1837, Reverend Jasper Adams, a professor at West Point, argued for a functional allocation of
powers that would give the faculty the right to determine the course of study, the choice of textbooks,
and the internal matters of instruction and administration. Id. at 237. The European tradition of faculty
governance was another source of support for faculty governance of academic matters. As late as 1960,
European professors who visited the United States evidenced surprise that “lay outsiders should
presume to exercise power over educational affairs.” JOHN J. CORSON, GOVERNANCE OF COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES 46 (1960).
61. 1915 Declaration, supra note 12, at 862. Richard Chait conducted a survey on faculty gover-
nance that confirmed there is a link between tenure and shared governance: “Tenure was a reliable, but
not infallible, indicator of greater faculty voice and slightly greater faculty interest in campus gover-
nance. . . . The absence of tenure suggested a comparatively vulnerable college where faculty have
relatively limited authority or interest in shared governance.” Richard P. Chait, Does Faculty Gover-
nance Differ at Colleges with Tenure and Colleges Without Tenure, in THE QUESTIONS OF TENURE 69, 96
(Richard P. Chait ed., 2002).
62. 1915 Declaration, supra note 12, at 865.
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freedom now depends. There are boards which leave nothing to be desired in
these respects; but there are also numerous bodies that have everything to
learn with regard to academic freedom. These barbarous boards exercise an
arbitrary power of dismissal. They exclude from the teachings of the univer-
sity unpopular or dangerous subjects. In some states they even treat profes-
sors’ positions as common political spoils . . . .”63
Even if a university ostensibly grants the faculties primary responsibility over
academic matters, however, the faculties may find it difficult to stand up for
academic values if individual faculty members remain mere at-will employees
who can be summarily dismissed. The Declaration, therefore, recommends two
procedural protections to support academic freedom and governance: (1) tenure
and (2) the right to a pretermination hearing before academic peers.
Tenure is endorsed not as an end in itself, but for its instrumental value in
attracting able people to become faculty members by providing some assurance
of freedom in research and teaching, and compensating for the relatively low
salaries offered.64 Tenure also should strengthen the ability of faculties and
individual faculty members to resist improper trustee pressure, just as the
Constitution supports judicial independence by providing protection for federal
judges during good behavior.65
Thus, tenure is designed to support faculty members in their search for truth
even when their research leads them to positions that are unpopular or unwel-
come to the public or to their own governing boards.66 Contrary to popular
63. Id. at 864 (quoting Charles William Eliot, President, Harvard Univ., Academic Freedom, An
Address Delivered Before the New York Chapter of the Phi Beta Kappa Society at Cornell University
(May 29, 1907)). Eliot’s successor at Harvard, A. Lawrence Lowell, who worked as a corporate lawyer
for seventeen years before joining the academy, wrote in even more detail about the appropriate
relationship between the faculty and governing boards. See LOWELL, supra note 23, at 281. Lowell
reasoned that corporate boards are not good role models for university boards because there are no
private owners of a university for members of the governing board to represent. Universities are more
like trusts, he concluded, than they are like for-profit corporations. Id. at 285. Lowell favored the same
division of labor between board and faculty endorsed by Eliot and the Declaration, but opposed
developing written rules to govern their relationship because he thought it ought to be based on trust.
He compared the relationship to marriage and added, “If a husband and wife should attempt to define
by regulations their respective rights and duties in the household, that marriage could safely be
pronounced a failure.” Id. at 290–91.
64. 1915 Declaration, supra note 12, at 864–65.
65. See id. at 866 (“University teachers should be understood to be, with respect to the conclusions
reached and expressed by them, no more subject to the control of the trustees, than are judges subject to
control of the president, with respect to their decisions.”); see also CLARK BYSE & LOUIS JOUGHIN,
TENURE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: PLANS, PRACTICES, AND THE LAW 5 (1959) (“The government
pays judges but it does not tell them how to decide. An independent . . . university is as essential to the
community as an independent judiciary.” (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY
241 (1956))).
66. The Declaration catalogues the various external pressures that have threatened academic free-
dom in America from the early period, when the “chief menace . . . was ecclesiastical, and the
disciplines chiefly affected were philosophy and the natural sciences” to “more recent times [when] the
danger zone has been shifted to the political and social sciences.” 1915 Declaration, supra note 12, at
868. In private colleges and universities, according to the Declaration, the primary risk is to opinions
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understanding, tenure never was intended to provide lifetime job security; the
Declaration explicitly provides that tenure may be terminated in appropriate
circumstances, although termination must be for legitimate reasons that are
formulated in advance with “reasonable definiteness” by each institution.67
Even tenure may not provide sufficient protection for academic freedom,
however, if the governing board has sole authority to decide whether particular
expressions by individual faculty members are protected by academic freedom.
The Declaration, therefore, follows the Kantian precept that “only scholars can
pass judgment on scholars as such,” and endorses a second procedural protec-
tion: faculty members, whether tenured or not, may not be disciplined or
dismissed for their ideas without a hearing before the faculty—or a duly
constituted committee of the faculty.68
In disputes that do not call for academic judgments, such as cases involving
“habitual neglect of assigned duties,” the Declaration acknowledges that lay
boards are qualified to decide whether there is cause for discipline or dis-
missal.69 When, however, dismissal or other disciplinary action is sought for
ideas that may be merely unpopular rather than evidence of scholarly incapac-
ity, only other scholars have the expert knowledge and experience to decide
whether dismissal is justified. As Professor Joan Scott has explained, “Aca-
demic freedom protects those whose thinking challenges orthodoxy; at the same
time the legitimacy of the challenge—the proof that the critic is not a madman
or a crank—is secured by membership in a disciplinary community based upon
shared commitments to certain methods, standards, and beliefs.”70
The Declaration thus adopts peer review backed up by disciplinary norms in
lieu of authorizing lay governing boards to evaluate the scholarship of faculty.71
Of course, peer review does not always work well. It can be undermined by
that question economic conditions or commercial practices because the governing body includes
trustees who are personally interested in “great private enterprises.” Id. at 869. In public institutions,
which are dependent on legislatures for funding, the primary risk is to opinions that are deemed
“ultra-conservative” rather than “ultra-radical.” Id. at 870.
67. Id. at 877.
68. “[Disciplinary] action can not with safety be taken by bodies not composed of members of the
academic profession. . . . [I]n matters of opinion, and of the utterance of opinion, [lay governing]
boards cannot intervene without destroying . . . the essential nature of a university—without converting
it from a place dedicated to openness of mind . . . into a place barred against the access of new light,
and precommitted to the opinions or prejudices of men who have not been set apart or expressly trained
for the scholar’s duties.” Id. at 875.
69. Id.
70. Joan W. Scott, Academic Freedom as an Ethical Practice, in THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
163, 166 (Louis Menand ed., 1996).
71. Professor Robert Post has identified a paradox that results from the Declaration’s reliance on
professional standards: “academic freedom [is] simultaneously limited by and independent of profes-
sional norms.” Post, supra note 37, at 75–78. Professors do not have academic freedom to violate
professional norms at will, yet professional norms ought to be subject to criticism and disagreement.
Post argues that the problem is somewhat mitigated by the fact that controversy is built into “the
everyday practice of scholarship,” although he cautions that the ideal of academic freedom will be
sustained only if peer reviewers use professional norms wisely. Id. at 76.
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inadequate disciplinary standards or such standards may be applied improperly
by faculty peers.72 The effectiveness of the Declaration’s reliance on peer
review, in other words, depends on the willingness of faculty to assume
responsibility for judging the scholarly work of other faculty, and doing so
fairly. The Declaration somewhat ominously warns that unless the academic
profession is willing “to purge its ranks of the incompetent and the unworthy,”
then others will assume that task.73
In evaluating the work of other scholars, faculty are expected to judge on the
basis of the quality of the research methodology employed and the arguments
presented rather than whether they agree with the conclusions reached. That is,
both a scholar’s work and peer evaluations of it are supposed to be objective or
“disinterested,” to use the terminology of the Declaration.74
72. The Declaration warns faculty that they must avoid letting academic freedom be used “as a
shelter for inefficiency, for superficiality, or for uncritical and intemperate partisanship.” 1915 Declara-
tion, supra note 12, at 872.
73. Id. In Professor Haskell’s memorable phrase: “Unchecked, the republic of letters becomes a
republic of pals.” HASKELL, supra note 38, at 215.
74. 1915 Declaration, supra note 12, at 865 (stating that a university teacher should not hold or
express “any conclusion which is not the genuine and uncolored product of his own study or that of
fellow-specialists,” and that scholars’ utterances, in particular, should not be shaped by the judgment of
“inexpert and possibly not wholly disinterested persons outside of their ranks”).
Northrop Frye provided one of the best descriptions of how a scholar should produce disinterested
scholarship:
One starts out with a tentative goal in mind, but on the way to it one must consider evidence
impartially and draw only the strictly rational conclusions from that evidence. Cooking or
manipulating the evidence to make it fit a preconceived idea works against detachment. . . .
. . . [E]very discipline must be as scientific as its subject matter will allow it to be, or
abandon all claim to be taken seriously . . . .
Northrop Frye, The Knowledge of Good and Evil, in THE MORALITY OF SCHOLARSHIP 3, 3–4 (Max Black
ed., 1967).
Professor J. Peter Byrne has expanded on Frye’s statement by noting that a disinterested scholar
“may be driven to conclusions by her respect for methodology and evidence that contradict her own
preconceptions and cherished assumptions.” Byrne, supra note 10, at 259; see also STEVEN M. CAHN,
SAINTS AND SCAMPS: ETHICS AND ACADEMIA 52 (1994) (“Reliable evaluators do not indulge in captious
criticism or inordinate praise. They refuse to glorify mediocrity but recognize that what is imperfect
may nevertheless be meritorious. They focus on the work to be judged and not on irrelevant factors
such as the author’s . . . political persuasion. In addition, they acknowledge their own intellectual
predilections, admitting that not all their judgments would be shared by other reputable authorities. . . .
Even a conceptual or methodological schism within a discipline should not prevent a reliable evaluator
from reaching a negative judgment about the work of an ally or a positive judgment about the work of
an opponent.”); HASKELL, supra note 38, at 149 (“Although [detachment] is an ideal and holds out a
standard higher than any of us routinely achieve, acceptable performance under its regulative influence
does not require superhuman effort. It is that frail and limited but perfectly real power that . . . permits
conscientious scholars to referee one another’s work fairly, to acknowledge merit even in the writings
of one’s critics, and successfully to bend over backwards when grading students so as not to penalize
those holding antagonistic political convictions.”).
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2. The 1940 Statement Codifies the 1915 Declaration
In 1940, a briefer version of the 1915 Declaration was adopted.75 It had been
negotiated between the AAUP and the Association of American Colleges (AAC),
an organization of presidents of undergraduate institutions.76 The 1940 State-
ment contains the same core principles as the Declaration: academic freedom is
endorsed along with its handmaiden—tenure—and faculty are to be given a due
process hearing before peers whenever a university seeks to dismiss or other-
wise discipline them over protected speech.77 The Statement adds a pragmatic
qualification to the hearing protection, however, by adding the phrase “if
possible.”78
The 1940 Statement, unlike the 1915 Declaration, was soon adopted widely,
aided no doubt by the fact that it had been written with, and endorsed by,
academic administrators as well as faculty members.79 By 2006, more than 200
learned societies and higher education associations had formally endorsed the
1940 Statement and its 1970 Interpretive Comments.80 The Statement also has
been adopted by most colleges and universities in the United States, and it is
widely incorporated or referenced in faculty contracts.81
The most important difference between the Declaration and the Statement for
these purposes is that the Statement does not discuss the governance role of
faculty. The Statement does describe faculty as “educational officers”82 rather
than as “employees,” however, thus at least implicitly acknowledging that
faculty have a role in governance of academic matters.
3. The 1966 Statement on Government
The task of elucidating shared governance was taken up in the 1966 State-
ment on Government of Colleges and Universities (Statement on Government),
which was jointly formulated by the AAUP, the American Council of Educa-
75. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure
with 1970 Interpretive Comments, in AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 3–11 (10th ed. 2006)
[hereinafter 1940 Statement].
76. Today the AAC is known as the Association of American Colleges and Universities (AACU).
77. 1940 Statement, supra note 75, at 3–4.
78. Id. at 4.
79. See Metzger, supra note 36, at 12–77.
80. 1940 Statement, supra note 75, at 7–11.
81. See, e.g., Vega v. Miller, 273 F.3d 460, 476 (2d Cir. 2001) (Cabranes, J., dissenting) (“The
AAUP’s 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure has been relied upon as
persuasive authority by courts to shed light on, and to resolve, a wide range of cases related to academic
freedom and tenure.”); Jimenez v. Almodovar, 650 F.2d 363, 368 (1st Cir. 1981) (“American court
decisions [on tenure] are consistent with the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Tenure widely adopted by institutions of higher education and professional organizations of faculty
members.”); Browzin v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 527 F.2d 843, 848 & n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“[The 1940
Statement] represent[s] widely shared norms within the academic community, having achieved accep-
tance by organizations which represent teachers as well as organizations which represent administrators
and governing boards.”).
82. 1940 Statement, supra note 75, at 3.
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tion, and the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges
(AGB).83 The Statement on Government begins by emphasizing the need for
“appropriately shared responsibility and cooperative action” by boards, facul-
ties, and administrators if they are to cope with “the variety and complexity of
the tasks performed” by modern colleges and universities.84 The need for a
unified institutional position is more important than ever, the Statement ex-
plains, because legislative and governmental authorities at all levels are playing
an increasing part in shaping academic policy. It also advises governing boards
to “undertake appropriate self-limitation” by “entrust[ing] the conduct of admin-
istration to the administrative officers [and] teaching and research to the fac-
ulty.”85
The Statement on Government, like the 1915 Declaration, justifies giving
faculties primary responsibility for academic matters on the basis of their
expertise.86 It also includes an illustrative list of matters that are “academic”
and, therefore, should be overseen primarily by the faculty: “curriculum, subject
matter and methods of instruction, research, faculty status, and those aspects of
student life that relate to the educational process.”87
The Statement explains that giving the faculty primary responsibility means
that the president and the board should overrule faculty decisions about aca-
demic matters “only in exceptional circumstances, and for reasons communi-
cated to the faculty.”88 Budgets and personnel limitations are identified as the
types of factors that may justify a board in rejecting faculty advice. Faculty
participation in the governance of academic matters should be arranged at all
relevant levels including departments and schools as well as through a faculty-
elected Senate. Participation may take a variety of forms, moreover, including
standing committees, joint ad hoc committees, and membership of faculty
members on administrative bodies.89
To improve the academic quality of faculty, the Statement in effect adopts a
one-way ratchet: an affirmative vote on tenure by the faculty of a department or
83. Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, 1966 Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities, in
AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 135–40 (10th ed. 2006) [hereinafter Statement on Government].
The Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges issued a separate statement on
institutional governance in 1988 that is more critical of shared governance. See AGB Statement, supra
note 25, at 3.
84. Statement on Government, supra note 83, at 135–36.
85. Id. at 138.
86. Id. The Statement on Government lists examples of the kinds of matters that are a mix of
academic and business judgments, and thus should involve the participation of the board, administra-
tion, and faculty. Such matters include “major changes in the size or composition of the student body
and the relative emphasis to be given to the various elements of the education and research program.”
Id. at 136.
87. Id. at 139. Faculty also should establish “the requirements for the degrees offered in the course,
determine[] when the requirements have been met, and authorize[] the president and board to grant the
degrees thus achieved.” Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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a campus-wide faculty committee is necessary, but it is not sufficient.90 The
administration (or governing board) may turn down a candidate approved by the
relevant faculty for compelling reasons, but only in rare instances, and their
reasons should be stated in detail.91 The administration (or governing board)
should not deny tenure merely because they disagree with a candidate’s ideas,
nor grant tenure to a candidate who has not been duly approved by the faculty.
4. The Challenge of Shared Governance
Not all colleges and universities in the United States have adopted shared
governance.92 It has been criticized in some quarters as cumbersome because
“timely decisions are difficult to make, and small factions often are able to
impede the decision-making process.”93 A 1996 report opposed to shared
governance warned that “[i]nstitutions ignore a changing environment at their
peril,” and added that “[l]ike dinosaurs, [universities] risk becoming exhibits in
a kind of cultural Jurassic Park: places of great interest and curiosity, increas-
ingly irrelevant in a world that has passed them by.”94 Most of these criticisms
fail to distinguish between governance of academic and of nonacademic mat-
ters. They also assume that speed is a virtue. When it comes to academic
matters, however, it may not be. As Harvard University President Drew Gilpin
Faust has explained, “A university is not about results in the next quarter . . . . It
is about learning that molds a lifetime, learning that transmits the heritage of
millennia; learning that shapes the future.”95 Moreover, shared governance does
not mean that everyone or even every component of a college or university must
agree. Even within a faculty, after appropriate deliberation, votes can be taken
to decide a matter opposed by only a small faction. Shared governance also
supports making use of the skills of different parts of a college or university for
the greater good. Faculty who trust the administration are likely to delegate a
great many tasks to them. Conversely, successful department chairs, deans, and
presidents typically are able to work with the faculty to build consensus by
using committees to incubate new approaches and by consulting widely before
submitting matters for formal faculty votes.
90. See id. (“Determinations in these matters should first be made by faculty action through
established procedures . . . .” (emphasis added)).
91. Id.
92. See infra notes 215–233 and accompanying text (discussing the Yeshiva standard and institutions
that do not meet that standard).
93. AGB Statement, supra note 25, at 3.
94. Robert Birnbaum, The End of Shared Governance: Looking Ahead or Looking Back, in RESTRUC-
TURING SHARED GOVERNANCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION 5, 6–7 (William G. Tierney & Vicente M. Lechuga
eds., 2004) (quoting KELLOGG COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF STATE AND LAND-GRANT COLLEGES 1
(1996)).
95. Drew Gilpin Faust, Installation Address: Unleashing Our Most Ambitious Imaginings, HARV.
MAG., Nov.–Dec. 2007, at 62, available at http://www.president.harvard.edu/speeches/faust/071012
installation.html; see also Birnbaum, supra note 94, at 7 (“The greatest danger to higher education may
not be that decisions are made too slowly because of the drag of consultation, but that they are made
too swiftly and without regard for institutional core values.”).
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Other critics of shared governance have argued that university governance
should be more corporate in style.96 A more hierarchical approach to academic
matters, however, could undermine the ability of the institutions to perform
their core functions of teaching and research.97 As Derek Bok has noted, “No
one ever raised the level of scholarship by ordering professors to write better
books, nor has the quality of teaching ever improved by telling instructors to
give more interesting classes. In these domains, good work depends on the
talent and enthusiasm of professors.”98 Giving faculties primary responsibility
for core academic matters is a proven way to strengthen their commitment to
96. See, e.g., James J. Duderstadt, Fire, Ready, Aim! University Decision-Making During an Era of
Rapid Change, in GOVERNANCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION: THE UNIVERSITY IN A STATE OF FLUX 26, 27
(Werner Z. Hirsch & Luc E. Weber eds., 2001) (“The faculty traditions of debate and consensus
building, along with the highly compartmentalized organization of academic departments and disci-
plines, seem incompatible with the breadth and rapid pace required in today’s high momentum
university-wide decision environment.”).
97. Professor D.G. Fraser of Worcester College made a similar point during the 2006 faculty debate
at Oxford:
How ironic that today’s leading businesses are moving in the opposite direction from the
failed 1970s policies [embodied in the proposed change in governance]. Dynamic knowledge-
based businesses are moving away from large, centrally administered monoliths, towards
small, self-organising entrepreneurial cells, flexibly connected and practically self determining
. . . just like Oxford colleges. . . . Look at . . . the Howard Hughes Medical Institute. They
have just set up a . . . campus to look at Neuroscience . . . and the management structure?
Small groups, collegiality, minimal management, trust in the past excellence of the people
they employ.
The debate ended with the faculty voting to reject an American-style lay governance board. Report of
Proceedings in Congregation, 14 November 2006, OXFORD U. GAZETTE, Nov. 22, 2006, available at
http://www.ox.ac.uk/gazette/2006-7/supps/1_4788.htm; see also Burton R. Clark, Faculty Organization
and Authority, in ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE: RESEARCH ON INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS AND DECISION MAKING
236, 240 (J. Victor Baldridge ed., 1971) (“As work becomes professionalized . . . the organization of
work must create room for expert judgment, and autonomy of decision-making and practice become a
hallmark of the advanced profession.”). Clark contends that faculty need more autonomy than other
professional groups:
Professionals who largely give advice or follow the guidelines of a received body of
knowledge require extensive but not great autonomy for the individual and the group. They
need sufficient leeway to give an honest expert opinion or to apply the canons of judgment of
their field. Those requiring great autonomy are those who wish to crawl along the frontiers of
knowledge . . . searching for the new—the new scientific finding, the new reinterpretation of
history, the new criticism in literature or art. Academic man is a special kind of professional
man, a type characterized by a particularly high need for autonomy. To be innovative, to be
critical of established ways, these are the commitments of the academy and the impulses of
scientific and scholarly roles that press for unusual autonomy.
Id. at 240–41. See generally WILLIAM G. TIERNEY, THE IMPACT OF CULTURE ON ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION
MAKING: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN HIGHER EDUCATION 133–75 (2008).
98. Derek Bok, 2006–2007 Annual Report to the Harvard Corporation, available at http://
harvardmagazine.com/breaking-news/president-boks-annual-report (last visited Jan. 17, 2009); cf. Joan
Scott, The Critical State of Shared Governance, 88 ACADEME 41, 43 (2002) (“[E]ducational institutions
have ways of dealing with conflict that are . . . different from those of businesses. There’s more give
and take, more discussion, more commitment to the exchange of ideas, and more respect for differ-
ences. Deliberation rather than speed characterizes this process.”). Bok, who served as president of
Harvard from 1979 to 1991, returned to serve as interim president from 2006 to 2007.
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the production and dissemination of knowledge.
On nonacademic matters, by contrast, from fundraising to management of the
endowment or the physical plant, corporate-style organization is both appropri-
ate and consistent with shared governance. A more hierarchical approach also
can expedite decisionmaking on time-sensitive, nonacademic matters. It is
common for governing boards, for example, to establish executive committees
or expedited procedures designed to handle matters that need immediate resolu-
tion between board meetings. Colleges and universities in recent years also have
developed procedures to ensure business continuity and safety on campus when
there is an emergency.
By the second-half of the twentieth century, the value of academic freedom,
including shared governance, had been recognized by most major colleges and
universities, public and private.99 The unresolved legal issue was whether
George Keller argues that faculty participation in governance works best at particular levels of
governance:
At the department level, professorial governance can and should be highly democratic, with
little administrative interference unless the faculty in the department drift from the institu-
tion’s policies or fall into disarray or decline. . . . Shared governance often works best,
especially at large universities, at the level of a specialized school or college: . . . medicine,
communications, business, and the like. The unit is small enough, the academic purposes are
more focused, and the deans are not responsible for such a wide spectrum of chores as
presidents. At the all-college or whole university level, shared governance increasingly is a
failure, although it can work quite effectively at smaller institutions if there is a mutual
understanding, mutual respect, and generosity of spirit. Yet large faculty senates are frequently
quarrel pits . . . and platforms for harangues . . . And the pace is often snail-like.
George Keller, A Growing Quaintness: Traditional Governance in the Markedly New Realm of U.S.
Higher Education, in COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE: NEGOTIATING THE PERFECT
STORM 158, 172 (William G. Tierney ed., 2004).
To avoid the problems seen in some faculty senates, Keller recommends having faculty participate
through special task forces that focus on a particular problem or issue and then dissolve. He notes that
many professors:
[A]re superb analysts, first-rate thinkers, and exceptionally knowledgeable persons, so when
their attention is captured for a special purpose and for a limited period, and they are given
adequate and detailed information about the topic and reasons for a decision on the topic, their
counsel and suggestions can be invaluable.
Id. at 173.
99. The 2001 Survey of Higher Education Governance is one of the few research studies to look
in-depth at the subject. It surveyed 1321 four-year institutions. Gabriel E. Kaplan, How Academic Ships
Actually Navigate, in GOVERNING ACADEMIA 165, 172 (Ronald G. Ehrenberg ed., 2004). Those surveyed
reported that 89.9% of the faculties had determinative or joint authority with the administration on
content of the curriculum; on faculty appointments, it was 69.9% of the faculties; on tenure, it was
66.1%. Id. at 184. The survey also found that faculty participation in governance of academic matters
increased over time. In 1970, faculties determined the content of curriculum at 45.6% of the institu-
tions, and they shared authority with the administration at another 36.4%. By 2001, faculties deter-
mined curriculum content at 62.8% of the institutions, and they shared authority at 30.4%. In 1970,
faculties determined the appointments of full-time faculty in 4.5% of the institutions, and they shared
authority at 26.4%. By 2001, faculties determined appointments of full-time faculty in 14.5% and
shared authority in 58.2% of the institutions. Id. at 202.
Faculty participation in governance varies significantly by type of institution. “In for-profits the
faculty are quite clearly employees, few faculty are involved in creating curriculum, and decision
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academic freedom at public colleges and universities would remain a profes-
sional right only, protected primarily by contract law—as at private institu-
tions—or would be granted constitutional protection.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
The academic freedom decisions of the Supreme Court naturally fall into two
distinct periods. In the early period, which began in 1952, the Court protected
the academic freedom of faculty from intrusions by state legislatures. The early
opinions also acknowledged the important contributions made by higher educa-
tion both in educating citizens and in serving as incubators for new knowledge.
In 1968, however, in Pickering v. Board of Education,100 the Court began to
provide constitutional protection for the speech of government employees
generally.101 Applying the new standard to faculty at public colleges and
universities, however, soon diluted constitutional protection of their academic
freedom.
After 1968, most Court cases involved internal rather than external chal-
lenges to academic freedom. The Court expanded the scope of constitutional
academic freedom, moreover, to apply to such governance matters as the
freedom to decide who shall teach and who shall be admitted. Increasingly,
however, it described these freedoms as belonging to the institution rather than
to the faculty as a body. Making academic freedom an institutional right does
not alter outcomes if the faculty and institution are aligned in opposition to an
external challenge. When there is a dispute between an individual faculty
member and the administration or lay governing board of an institution, how-
ever, the Court’s rhetorical assignment of the right to the institution could
undermine the academic freedom of all faculty. The problem of deciding how
much judicial deference should be given to academic decisions made by
institutions is compounded by the Court’s failure to discuss the governance role
of faculties.
A. EARLY COURT DECISIONS ADDRESS EXTERNAL THREATS
Academic freedom was not mentioned in any American judicial decision
until 1940, a quarter century after the AAUP Declaration was issued.102 The
delay was consistent with the widespread skepticism that initially greeted the
making of all sorts is firmly in the hands of managers.” Brian Pusser & Sarah E. Turner, Nonprofit and
For-Profit Governance in Higher Education, in GOVERNING ACADEMIA 235, 251 (Ronald G. Ehrenberg
ed., 2004).
100. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
101. Id. at 574.
102. See Kay v. Bd. of Higher Educ. of N.Y., 18 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sup. Ct.), aff’d, 20 N.Y.S.2d 1016
(App. Div.), app. denied, 29 N.E.2d 657 (N.Y. 1940). This first judicial mention of “academic freedom”
occurred in a case with unfortunate parallels to the trial of Socrates for corrupting the youth of Athens.
The trial court in Kay overturned the decision of City College to hire philosopher Bertrand Russell. The
court based its decision on books published by Russell that supported the idea of “temporary childless
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Declaration.103 More than another decade passed, moreover, before the Su-
preme Court addressed the concept. The first academic freedom cases heard by
the Court did not involve the intrusions by “barbarous boards” feared by
Charles Eliot and the drafters of the 1915 Declaration; instead, the early cases
involved external threats posed by state government actions. Of the four most
important cases from this period, three involved state legislation intended to bar
the public employment of subversives; a fourth grew out of a state investigation
into alleged subversive activities, including a class taught at a state university.
Justice Frankfurter, a tenured professor of law at Harvard before his appoint-
ment to the Court, had the most to say about academic freedom in these early
cases,104 although it was Justice Douglas, formerly a tenured professor of law at
Yale, who first used the term “academic freedom” in his dissenting opinion in
marriages” by university students, and it held that his appointment would undermine “the morals of
students.” Id. at 827, 831.
103. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
104. Frankfurter was involved in several challenges to academic freedom at Harvard. In May 1921,
Austen Fox, a member of the Board of Overseers, submitted a statement complaining about an article
that Professor Zachariah Chafee, Jr. had published in the Harvard Law Review that was critical of the
conviction of Jacob Abrams and several codefendants. That conviction was for distributing leaflets,
which urged munitions workers to stop producing war material that could be used against revolutionary
forces in Russia, and for endorsing a petition for pardon submitted to the President of the United States.
ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD: A HISTORY OF IDEAS AND MEN 1817–1967, at 252–55
(1967). Fox’s complaint, together with a petition for pardoning Chafee signed by Dean Pound,
Frankfurter, and other faculty was referred to the Visiting Committee of the Law School, which held
what became known as “the Trial at the Harvard Club.” Id. at 255. In the end the committee found no
impropriety in Chafee’s signing the petition for the pardon of Abrams and that any erroneous statements
in the article were minor and could be corrected in a future issue of the law review. No further action
was recommended or taken. Id.
In 1927, Professor Frankfurter published an article in the Atlantic Monthly criticizing as unjust the
trial of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, who were convicted for murdering a shoefactory
paymaster and his guard. Dean Wigmore of Northwestern Law School published an article disagreeing
with Frankfurter. The governor appointed a committee of three that included President Lowell of
Harvard, the president of MIT, and a retired judge to advise him on clemency in the case. The
committee reported that Sacco and Vanzetti had been properly convicted. The governor denied
clemency, and they were executed. Despite his disagreement with Frankfurter about the fairness of the
trial, Lowell resisted calls from alumni to dismiss Frankfurter, explaining that in his judgment only
moral turpitude would justify dismissing a professor. Id. at 261–62.
In 1934, two popular economics instructors active in left-wing politics were given terminal appoint-
ments rather than appointments with the possibility of tenure. Eight senior professors, including
Frankfurter, were asked by Harvard President James Conant to look into the matter. The Committee of
Eight concluded that no political bias had been involved in the appointment decisions, but that the two
instructors had been denied a fair review. They recommended that the university give them appoint-
ments with the possibility of tenure. Conant refused to follow the recommendations of the Committee.
He did ask the Committee, however, to review promotion procedures generally. He was concerned that
without a limit on the length of nontenured appointments, mediocre faculty would be kept on. The
Committee recommended the process that still prevails at Harvard: nontenured faculty stay a maximum
of eight years. Then it is up or out, based first on a formal review and vote by their department.
Affirmative departmental recommendations are reviewed by an ad hoc committee of outside scholars,
and the final decision is made by the president and governing board. MORTON KELLER & PHYLLIS
KELLER, MAKING HARVARD MODERN: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S UNIVERSITY 66–68 (2001).
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Adler v. Board of Education.105
In Adler, the Court rejected a challenge brought by teachers to the Feinberg
law, a New York statute that authorized the state to refuse to hire any applicant,
or to fire any public employee, who supported using violence to alter the form
of government in the United States. The law also made membership in any
listed subversive group prima facie evidence that the person was in violation of
the law. Justice Douglas, in a dissent joined by Justice Black, concluded that the
law should have been held unconstitutional.106 School is a “cradle of our
democracy,” he argued, one that should foster “bold and adventuresome”
thinking.107 Justice Douglas emphasized the importance of education in the
production of new discoveries and warned that, without academic freedom,
“[s]upineness and dogmatism take the place of inquiry.”108 He was particularly
concerned about the threat that the law posed to teachers:
What happens under this law is typical of what happens in a police state.
Teachers are under constant surveillance; their pasts are combed for signs of
disloyalty; their utterances are watched for clues to dangerous thoughts. A pall
is cast over the classrooms. There can be no real academic freedom in that
environment.109
The same Term, in Wieman v. Updegraff,110 the Court held unconstitutional
an Oklahoma statute that required all state employees, including faculty mem-
bers at public colleges and universities, to take a loyalty oath.111 Justice
Frankfurter concurred in the Court’s decision and, joined by Justice Douglas,
emphasized the close ties between education and democracy.112 Justice Frank-
furter, like Justice Douglas in Adler, highlighted the importance of academic
freedom to the successful functioning of a university.113
105. 342 U.S. 485, 509, 510, 511 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 508. Justice Frankfurter dissented as well, but on jurisdictional grounds. Id. at 497–98
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 508, 511 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 510.
109. Id.
110. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
111. Id. at 191.
112. Id. at 196 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (observing that public opinion can be “disciplined and
responsible” only if “habits of open-mindedness and of critical inquiry” are acquired in a citizen’s
formative years). Justice Frankfurter added that it was not hyperbole to regard teachers from primary
grades to the university as the “priests of our democracy.” Id.
In contrast, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court in Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1, drew a firm line between higher education and elementary and secondary
schools: “In upholding the admissions plan in Grutter . . . this Court relied upon considerations unique
to institutions of higher education, noting that in light of ‘the expansive freedoms of speech and thought
associated with the university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional
tradition.’” 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2754 (2007) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003)). He
declined to extend the Grutter holding to elementary and secondary schools. Id.
113. Wieman, 344 U.S. at 196 (noting that faculty need “conditions for the practice of a responsible
and critical mind” if they are to “fulfill their function by precept and practice”).
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To further illuminate the mission of universities, Justice Frankfurter quoted
congressional testimony given by Robert Hutchins, the former president of the
University of Chicago, that a university should be “a center of independent
thought and criticism.”114 Hutchins saw higher education as “a kind of continu-
ing dialogue,” and added that “a dialogue assumes, in the nature of the case,
different points of view.”115
Hutchins’s words recall the 1915 Declaration’s description of a university as
“an intellectual experiment station, where new ideas may germinate.”116 By
quoting Hutchins, Justice Frankfurter emphasized both how the academic work-
place differs from other public workplaces, and the value of that difference to
the nation. We might not want the state bureau of motor vehicles to be a hotbed
of independent thought, but colleges and universities need to be if they are to
produce new knowledge for the benefit of students and the nation.
In 1957, a mere three years after the decision in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,117 a majority of the Justices, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,118 for the first
time affirmed the importance of academic freedom.119 They could not agree,
however, on a constitutional basis for deciding the case. Sweezy, who was
co-editor of a progressive economics journal, had been a guest lecturer in a
humanities course at the University of New Hampshire. When he was investi-
gated for possible subversive activities by the New Hampshire Attorney Gen-
eral, Sweezy denied ever belonging to the Communist Party but, invoking his
constitutional rights, refused to answer questions about what he had said to
students in class.120 When Sweezy was held in contempt of court for his refusal
to answer, he appealed.121
The Court overturned his contempt conviction.122 Chief Justice Warren,
114. Id. at 197 (quoting Hearing Before the House Select Comm. To Investigate Tax-Exempt
Foundations and Comparable Organizations, 82d Cong. (1952) (statement of Robert M. Hutchins,
Assoc. Dir. of the Ford Found.)).
Harold Shapiro, former president of Princeton, expanded on this understanding when he described a
university as “a place where the achievements, hopes, and interests of our recovered past meet and
interact with those of the present as we shape our cultural traditions for the future. The contemporary
research university [can] be thought of as holding a continuing conversation with both past and future
generations regarding those matters that are truly significant.” HAROLD T. SHAPIRO, A LARGER SENSE OF
PURPOSE: HIGHER EDUCATION AND SOCIETY 10 (2005).
115. Wieman, 344 U.S. at 197 (quoting Hearing Before the House Select Comm. To Investigate
Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations, 82d Cong. (1952) (statement of Robert M.
Hutchins, Assoc. Dir. of the Ford Found.)).
116. See supra text accompanying note 40.
117. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
118. 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (plurality opinion).
119. Id. at 250.
120. Id. at 254–55. Sweezy also refused to answer questions about the Progressive Party. The Court
upheld Sweezy’s refusal to answer those questions as well, and noted that in the 1948 election the
Progressive Party had offered a slate of candidates headed by Henry Wallace, a former vice president of
the United States. Id. at 242–44, 255.
121. Id. at 255.
122. Id. at 254–55.
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joined by Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan, held that the lower court’s use
of the contempt power denied Sweezy due process. Chief Justice Warren also
extolled both the importance of higher education to the nation and the impor-
tance of academic freedom in the academic workplace: “Scholarship cannot
flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must
always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity
and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.”123
In a concurring opinion that rested on the First Amendment rather than the
Due Process Clause, Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Harlan, agreed that
academic freedom is needed for universities to function effectively.124 Justice
Frankfurter included a quotation from a recent conference of senior scholars
from the University of Cape Town and the University of Witwatersrand in South
Africa, which has since become a touchstone for understanding constitutional
academic freedom:
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most
conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in
which there prevail “the four essential freedoms” of a university—to deter-
mine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how
it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.125
Justice Frankfurter thereby broke important, new conceptual ground.126 Al-
though Sweezy was about teaching, the South African conference quotation that
123. Id. at 250.
124. Id. at 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 263. The two universities were known as “Open Universities” because they admitted
black as well as white students. CONFERENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNIV. OF CAPE TOWN AND THE
UNIV. OF THE WITWATERSRAND, THE OPEN UNIVERSITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA iii (1957) [hereinafter CONFER-
ENCE REPORT]. The conference was convened because the government of South Africa had announced
that it intended to prohibit students of different races from attending universities together. Id. The report
invoked academic freedom to argue that universities should be able to decide for themselves whom to
admit. Id. at 7–9. It cited Brown v. Board of Education for its holding that separate educational facilities
are inherently unequal. Id. at 43. In 1959, the South African government passed a law that barred
universities from admitting “non-white persons.” Extension of the University Education Act 45 of
1959.
126. Justice Frankfurter’s adoption of “the four essential freedoms” was used as precedent by Justice
Powell in 1978 in his opinion announcing the judgment of the Court in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See infra notes 167–77 and accompanying text. In 1981, in
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), Justice Powell, this time writing for a majority of the Court,
again favorably cited Frankfurter’s Sweezy opinion. Id. at 276 (“[We do not] question the right of the
University . . . ‘to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.’”). In 2003, a majority of the Court in Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), held that Michigan Law School had a compelling interest in attaining a
diverse student body, and cited Powell’s opinion in Bakke as precedent. 539 U.S. at 329, 332–33.
In Grutter, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, criticized the “constitutionalization” of aca-
demic freedom that began with the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy: “I doubt that
when Justice Frankfurter spoke of government intrusions into the independence of universities, he was
thinking of the Constitution’s ban on racial discrimination.” Id. at 356 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice
Frankfurter clearly was thinking about the need to have a diverse student body—that was the impetus
2009] 971FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
he used expanded constitutional academic freedom to include academic gover-
nance matters as well as research and teaching. This was the same robust
understanding of academic freedom that had been adopted in the 1915 Declara-
tion.127
In contrast to the Declaration, however, the quotation states that the four
freedoms belong to the “university.” Some courts have relied on this language
to hold that academic freedom does not protect individual faculty members,128
but such an interpretation overlooks the plurality opinion in Sweezy, Justice
Frankfurter’s statements in other parts of his Sweezy concurrence as well as in
other cases, and the circumstances of the South African conference.
Chief Justice Warren’s plurality opinion in Sweezy made clear that academic
freedom protects individual faculty and noted approvingly that even the New
Hampshire Supreme Court had conceded below that Sweezy had a constitution-
ally protected right to lecture.129 Warren added that “there unquestionably was
an invasion of petitioner’s liberties in the area[] of academic freedom.”130
Justice Frankfurter in his concurrence made clear that lecturing is a part of
the intellectual life of a university that is constitutionally protected.131 He also
noted, as did the plurality, that the New Hampshire Supreme Court correctly
recognized that Sweezy had a constitutionally guaranteed right to lecture.132
And, to underscore his belief that academic freedom protects individual faculty,
he added, “[W]hen weighed against the grave harm resulting from governmen-
tal intrusion into the intellectual life of a university, such justification for
compelling a witness to discuss the contents of his lecture appears grossly
inadequate.”133
In several earlier opinions, Justice Frankfurter also had made clear that he
considered constitutional academic freedom to be an individual as well as an
institutional right. In his dissent in Adler, for example, Justice Frankfurter held
that the claims of the plaintiffs touched on the deepest interests of a democratic
society including “ample scope for the individual’s freedom, especially the
teacher’s freedom of thought, inquiry and expression.”134 And, in his concur-
rence in Wieman, Justice Frankfurter spoke at length about the importance of
the right of teachers to freedom of thought and noted that it is a right protected
by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.135
for the report from the Conference of the Open Universities that had taken place earlier the same year
that Sweezy was decided.
127. See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 410 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[Academic
freedom] inheres in the University, not in individual professors . . . .”).
129. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 249–50 (plurality opinion).
130. Id. at 250.
131. Id. at 261 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 260–61.
133. Id. at 260.
134. Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 504 (1952).
135. In particular, Justice Frankfurter stated:
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The participants in the conference that produced the report quoted by Justice
Frankfurter were trustees and faculty members of the Open Universities in
South Africa. The two groups were in agreement, moreover, that their universi-
ties should be able to continue their nondiscriminatory admissions policies in
the face of government opposition. Thus, the conference participants were using
the word “university” in the thick sense of faculty and board united, not in the
thin sense of lay governing board only.136
One decade after Sweezy, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,137 the Court for
the second time heard a challenge to New York’s Feinberg law.138 In the years
since Adler was decided, Cold War fears about subversives had receded some-
what. In addition, public opinion had turned against Senator Joseph McCarthy’s
tactics, and he had been censured by the Senate.139 This time, the Court held the
law unconstitutional. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, included the
strongest statement yet made by the Court about the constitutional position of
the freedom: “[A]cademic freedom . . . is of transcendent value to all of us and
not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special
concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of
[I]n view of the nature of the teacher’s relation to the effective exercise of the rights which are
safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and by the Fourteenth Amendment, inhibition of freedom of
thought, and of action upon thought, in the case of teachers brings the safeguards of these
amendments vividly into operation. . . .
. . . .
. . . It is the special task of teachers to foster those habits of open-mindedness and critical
inquiry which alone make for responsible citizens, who, in turn, make possible an enlightened
and effective public opinion. Teachers must fulfill their function by precept and practice, by
the very atmosphere which they generate; they must be exemplars of open-mindedness and
free inquiry. They cannot carry out their noble task if the conditions for the practice of a
responsible and critical mind are denied to them. They must have the freedom of responsible
inquiry, by thought and action, into the meaning of social and economic ideas, into the
checkered history of social and economic dogma. They must be free to sift evanescent
doctrine, qualified by time and circumstance, from that restless, enduring process of extending
the bounds of understanding and wisdom . . . .
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195–97 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
136. The universities in South Africa were state-aided, but not state-controlled. Each was controlled
by a lay council, of which not more than one-third of the members were public officials. The faculty
senates were given specified powers over academic matters. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 125, at 1.
This was the governance context in which the report spoke of the freedoms of the university.
137. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
138. Id. at 592–93. During the intervening decade, Justice Douglas, writing for the Court in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), confirmed the constitutional position of academic
freedom. In the course of announcing that there is a constitutional right of privacy, Justice Douglas used
academic freedom as an example of a constitutional right—like privacy—that is not mentioned in the
Constitution: “The right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print,
but . . . freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach . . . indeed the freedom of the
entire university community.” 381 U.S. at 482 (internal citations omitted). It is noteworthy that Justice
Douglas did not describe academic freedom as an institutional right, but as one that belongs to the
entire community, a phrase that presumably includes the faculty.
139. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 387–90 (2004).
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orthodoxy over the classroom.”140
One year later, however, the Court adopted a new constitutional standard for
public-employee speech—a change that over time would weaken the constitu-
tional position of academic freedom.
B. PUBLIC-EMPLOYEE SPEECH CASES LIMIT FACULTY ACADEMIC FREEDOM
The Court embraced a new constitutional standard for judging public-
employee speech in Pickering v. Board of Education.141 Before Pickering,
public-employee speech was subject to the right-privilege distinction relied on
by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford142
when he was still a justice on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. In
upholding the right of a city to fire a policeman for violating regulations that
prohibited political activity, Holmes in McAuliffe announced that “[t]he peti-
tioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitu-
tional right to be a policeman. . . . [T]he city may impose any reasonable
condition upon holding offices within its control.”143
Pickering rejected this right-privilege distinction.144 Marvin Pickering was a
high school teacher who wrote a letter that was published in the local newspa-
per. In it, he criticized the Board of Education and the district superintendent of
schools for spending too much of the school budget on athletics and not enough
on academic functions. Pickering was fired, and his firing was upheld by the
courts of Illinois. The Supreme Court overturned Pickering’s dismissal, how-
ever, and in the process extended some First Amendment protection to the
speech of public employees. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, used a
balancing test that weighed the interests of the employee as a citizen to
comment against the interests of the government-as-employer in “promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”145 Picker-
ing thus did not give government workers’ speech as much protection as the
First Amendment provides for the speech of citizens, although by rejecting the
McAuliffe right-privilege distinction, it gave some.146
In Connick v. Myers,147 a closely divided Court further limited the protection
provided by Pickering by holding that the First Amendment protects public-
employee speech only when the subject matter is of public concern, not when
the speech involves matters of personal interest only.148 Even if employee
speech passes the public-concern test, moreover, it must still pass the Pickering
140. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
141. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
142. 291 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892).
143. Id. at 517–18.
144. The right-privilege distinction was already eroding by the time Pickering was decided. See,
e.g., Olson v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 301 F. Supp. 1356, 1359 (D. Minn. 1969).
145. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
146. Id. at 574.
147. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
148. Id. at 147.
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balancing test.149
In applying the Pickering balancing test in Connick, the Court quoted with
approval Justice Powell’s description of the public workplace from an earlier
case:
“To this end, the Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion and
control over the management of its personnel and internal affairs. This
includes the prerogative to remove employees whose conduct hinders efficient
operation and to do so with dispatch. Prolonged retention of a disruptive or
otherwise unsatisfactory employee can adversely affect discipline and morale
in the workplace, foster disharmony, and ultimately impair the efficiency of an
office or agency.”150
The typical academic workplace is quite different, however, from the public
workplace described by Justice Powell. In a university, debate is not only
acceptable, it is a vital part of the continuing dialogue celebrated by Robert
Hutchins—a dialogue that depends on the expression of different points of
view.151 As the Court itself has recognized, the professional expertise of the
faculty is “indispensable to the formulation and implementation of academic
policy.”152 Thus, neither the Pickering balancing test nor the Connick public-
concern test seems particularly suited to the nature of the academic workplace.
A number of lower court decisions illustrate this mismatch. In Brown v. Ar-
menti,153 the Third Circuit held that a professor could be fired for writing a
critical review of the president of his university for presentation to the Board of
Trustees. The court found that his expression did not pass the Connick public-
concern test.154 In Clinger v. New Mexico Highlands University,155 the Tenth
Circuit denied a retaliation claim in a tenure-denial case in which a faculty
member had criticized a proposed academic reorganization for being in conflict
with the Faculty Handbook and advocated a “no confidence vote” for some
members of the governing board. The court held that her expressions did not
pass the Connick test.156 The courts may have been correct to hold that the
challenged statements were not of interest to the general public, but that
standard undercuts the ability of universities to function as refuges from the
149. Id. at 150.
150. Id. at 151 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)).
151. See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text.
152. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 689 (1980). For a discussion of Yeshiva, see infra text
accompanying notes 215–228.
153. 247 F.3d 69 (3d Cir. 2001).
154. Id. at 79.
155. 215 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2000).
156. See id. at 1166–67; see also Hong v. Grant, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (finding that
faculty criticism of the hiring process and use of too many adjuncts to teach departmental courses does
not pass the public-concern test). For a discussion of Hong, see infra notes 292–98 and accompanying
text.
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merely fashionable.157
It was against this background that Garcetti was decided. Richard Ceballos
was a deputy district attorney in the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s
Office.158 After receiving complaints from a defense attorney, Ceballos exam-
ined the affidavit used to obtain a key search warrant in a pending case and
concluded that the affidavit contained serious misrepresentations.159 Although
he expressed his concerns to his supervisors, they decided to proceed with the
prosecution.160 Ceballos was called as a witness by the defense, but the trial
court upheld the warrant.161 Believing he was subjected to retaliatory employ-
ment actions (including reassignment to another position, transfer to another
courthouse, and denial of a promotion) because of his complaints about the
affidavit, Ceballos filed suit against his supervisors.162 The Supreme Court held
that his statements passed both the Connick public-concern test and the Picker-
ing balancing test, but they ruled against him nonetheless on the ground that the
First Amendment does not shield from discipline expressions that are made
pursuant to the “official duties” of a public employee.163
The Court in Garcetti explained that it wanted to avoid having too many
disputes about the work of public employees litigated in federal court as First
Amendment cases.164 Unfortunately, as Justice Souter warned in his dissent, the
standard the Court embraced calls into question whether any constitutional
protection remains for the research, teaching, and academic governance respon-
sibilities of faculty at public colleges and universities.165
C. POST-PICKERING DECISIONS EMBRACE ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE AS PART OF
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
In contrast to the early academic freedom opinions of the Court, almost all of
the post-Pickering decisions involved internal university disputes rather than
threats from outside the university. Moreover, the internal dispute cases heard,
for the most part, were brought by students—or would-be students—rather than
by faculty members. The change in plaintiffs no doubt reflects the fact that after
Pickering, most lower courts treated faculty-initiated internal disputes as ordi-
nary public-employee speech cases.
The first two academic freedom decisions of importance were announced in
the spring of 1978: Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horo-
157. See infra text accompanying notes 280–83.
158. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413 (2006).
159. Id. at 414.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 414–15.
162. Id. at 415.
163. Id. at 426.
164. Id. at 423 (“Ceballos’ [claim if adopted] would commit state and federal courts to a new,
permanent, and intrusive role, mandating judicial oversight of communications between and among
government employees and their superiors in the course of official business.”).
165. Id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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witz166 and Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.167 When medical
student Charlotte Horowitz was dismissed from medical school for failing to
meet academic standards, she sued, arguing that she was entitled to a hearing
before being dismissed.168 In denying her request, Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the Court, emphasized that an academic judgment about a student’s ability to
perform adequately as a doctor is more subjective and evaluative than the
factual questions presented in most public-employee disciplinary decisions.169
A public hearing might be useless or even harmful in assessing such academic
judgments because they require “expert evaluation of cumulative informa-
tion.”170 Justice Rehnquist thus both confirmed the important role of faculty in
establishing graduation standards for students and deferred to it when he
declined “to ignore the historic judgment of educators” by imposing procedural
due process standards on the academic dismissal process.171
That same year in Bakke, a closely divided Court struck down the special
admissions policy of the Medical School of the University of California at
Davis under which sixteen of the one hundred places in the entering class had
been set aside for minority students.172 In announcing the judgment of the
Court, Justice Powell held that race may be one factor used in deciding whether
to admit a candidate as part of an admissions policy crafted to achieve a diverse
student body, as long as race is not the sole factor.173 In defending this position,
Justice Powell argued that having a diverse student body is a constitutionally
protected goal for an institution of higher education because academic freedom,
“though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed
as a special concern of the First Amendment.”174 He continued, “The freedom
of a university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection
of its student body,” and he cited Justice Frankfurter’s four essential free-
doms.175 Justice Powell concluded that because the right to select the students is
protected by the First Amendment, it can counterbalance equal protection
concerns raised by appropriately structured special-admission programs.176 The
Davis program did not pass muster, even though the faculty had devised the
admissions policy, because it used race as the sole factor in setting aside sixteen
places.177 In short, according to Justice Powell, a broad understanding of
academic freedom that includes such academic matters as the policy on admis-
166. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
167. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
168. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 79–80.
169. See id. at 89–90.
170. Id. at 90.
171. Id.
172. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 271, 275.
173. Id. at 272.
174. Id. at 311–12.
175. Id. at 312.
176. Id. at 313.
177. Id. at 320.
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sions is protected by the Constitution, but academic freedom does not always
trump other constitutional values. In particular, academic freedom may not be
used to insulate from the demands of the equal protection clause an admissions
set-aside that rests entirely on race.
In Bakke, Justice Powell did not discuss in any detail the role of faculty in
carrying out the four essential freedoms. Their role was addressed explicitly,
however, in Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing.178 Scott Ewing was
dismissed from medical school, but, unlike Charlotte Horowitz, he brought a
substantive rather than a procedural due process challenge.179 Ewing had en-
rolled in a special program in which students could earn both a college and
medical degree in six years.180 Before beginning the final two years of the
program, students were required to complete four years of basic medical science
courses and to pass the NBME, a two-day, written test administered by the
National Board of Medical Examiners.181 Ewing had both academic and per-
sonal difficulties during his first four years and failed the NBME.182 In fact, he
received the lowest score on the NBME ever received by a student in the
program. The medical school’s Promotion and Review Board reviewed his
record and recommended that he be dismissed.183 One week later they recon-
vened, and gave him an opportunity to explain why the test did not fairly reflect
his academic progress or potential. The nine voting members present then
reaffirmed the earlier decision to drop Ewing from the program.184
Justice Stevens, for a unanimous Court, upheld the decision to dismiss
Ewing, emphasizing that the judgment that Ewing did not meet academic
standards was made by faculty, and that “the faculty’s decision was made
conscientiously and with careful deliberation, based on an evaluation of the
entirety of Ewing’s academic career.”185 Faculty decisions are not immune from
challenge according to the Court, but any challenger must meet a very high
standard: judges should not override a faculty’s professional judgment unless it
is “such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demon-
strate that the faculty did not exercise professional judgment.”186 The decision
of the Michigan faculty in Ewing passed the test.187
Justice Stevens identified a number of reasons why the judiciary should defer
to academic decisions, including the Court’s “reluctance to trench on the
prerogatives of state and local educational institutions and our responsibility to
178. 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
179. Id. at 217.
180. Id. at 215.
181. Id. at 215–16.
182. Id. at 216.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 225.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 227.
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safeguard their academic freedom.”188 He added that if federal courts are not
“the appropriate forum in which to review the multitude of personnel decisions
that are made daily by public agencies,189 they are even less suited to evaluate
“the multitude of academic decisions that are made daily by faculty members of
public educational institutions.”190
The Court clarified an issue that had been much debated by scholars and
lower courts191 when it stated, in a footnote, that “[a]cademic freedom thrives
not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers
and students, but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decisionmak-
ing by the academy itself.”192 In other words, constitutional academic freedom
protects both individual faculty members and institutions.
Justice Stevens used the word “academy,” however, rather than “institution.”
(The word “academy” was also employed by Judge Posner in an academic
freedom decision handed down eight months earlier.193) The word “academy,”
which commonly refers to a society or association of scholars,194 suggests that
the Court agreed with the 1915 Declaration that academic freedom belongs to
the faculty as a body rather than to the institution in a corporate sense.
Because the faculty, administration, and board in Ewing were all in agree-
ment that Ewing should be dismissed, there was no reason for the Court to
discuss their respective roles. It is significant, therefore, that the Court empha-
sized that judicial deference was granted because faculty made the academic
decision: “When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely
academic decision, such as this one, they should show great respect for the
faculty’s professional judgment.”195 The Court, however, did not address the
question whether courts should be equally deferential to academic decisions
made by a governing board in the absence of faculty involvement.
The next academic freedom decision of interest, University of Pennsylvania
v. EEOC,196 unlike the decisions in Adler, Wieman, and Keyishian, involved a
federal, rather than a state, statute. The case also is one of the few to be heard by
188. Id. at 226.
189. Id. (quoting Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349 (1967)). In Bishop, the Court held that a city
employee had no right to a pretermination hearing. Id. at 350.
190. Id.
191. See supra note 11 (acknowledging the scholarly debate over whether academic freedom is an
individual or an institutional right).
192. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985) (internal citations
omitted).
193. Piarowsky v. Ill. Cmty. Coll. Dist. 515, 759 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[Academic
freedom] is used to denote both the freedom of the academy to pursue its ends without interference
from the government . . . and the freedom of the individual teacher . . . to pursue his ends without
interference from the academy . . . .”).
194. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 9
(Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1968) (“1: the school of philosophy founded by Plato; 2: a school above the
elementary level . . . ; 3: a society of learned individuals united for the advancement of the arts and
sciences . . . .”).
195. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225 (emphasis added).
196. 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
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the Court involving a private, rather than a public, university.197 The contro-
versy began when the University of Pennsylvania refused to comply with an
EEOC subpoena. The university argued that academic freedom protected the
confidentiality of the peer-review materials that the EEOC was seeking in
connection with a Title VII claim filed by a faculty member.198
Justice Blackmun, writing for a unanimous Court, called the university’s
reliance on the academic freedom cases “misplaced” because in those cases the
government had been attempting to control or direct the content of academic
speech.199 The earlier cases involved “direct” infringements of academic free-
dom, moreover, which he acknowledged includes the right to determine who
may teach.200 In Keyishian, noted Justice Blackmun, the government “was
attempting to substitute its teaching employment criteria for those already in
place at the academic institutions, directly and completely usurping the discre-
tion of each institution.”201 In University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, by contrast,
any burden on the ability of the university to determine who may teach was
indirect at best because the EEOC, unlike New York State, was not providing
criteria that the university was required to follow in selecting faculty.202
The distinction Justice Blackmun drew between direct and indirect infringe-
ments of academic freedom explains why a university may not claim a First
Amendment violation when it is taxed or subjected to other government regula-
tion.203 Even regulations that might deprive a university of revenue that “it
needs to bid for professors who are contemplating working for other academic
197. Most internal disputes over academic freedom at private colleges and universities are not
subject to constitutional norms because there are no public actors and, therefore, there is no state action.
In University of Pennyslvania v. EEOC, the EEOC went to court to enforce its subpoena for university
records, which provided the necessary state action. Id. at 185–88. The Court in its opinion makes clear
that it is prepared to act in an appropriate case to protect the academic freedom of faculty at a private
university from state intrusion: “Obvious First Amendment problems would arise where government
attempts to direct the content of speech at private universities. Such content-based regulation of private
speech traditionally has carried with it a heavy burden of justification.” Id. at 198 n.6.
The Court adds that government attempts to direct the content of speech at public educational
institutions raise particularly complicated First Amendment issues because “government is simulta-
neously both speaker and regulator.” Id. Judge Posner has acknowledged the difficulty of resolving
these First Amendment issues and noted, “It is, to be sure, a considerable mystery why government is in
the business of owning and operating colleges and universities in the first place. The mystery is not
public support of education, but public operation.” RICHARD POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 88
(2003). Posner would prefer having government get out of the business of operating universities,
thereby removing such issues as affirmative action from the constitutional agenda. Id.
198. Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 185–86.
199. Id. at 197.
200. Id. at 198.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Professor J. Peter Byrne considers NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,
468 U.S. 85 (1984), which upheld antitrust limitations on NCAA football television contracts, to be a
good example of the Court rejecting arguments for deference because it saw no direct connection with
academic concerns. J. Peter Byrne, Constitutional Academic Freedom After Grutter: Getting Real About
the “Four Freedoms” of a University, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 929, 941 (2006).
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institutions or in industry” are only indirect burdens, the Court added, and thus
are constitutional.204
Finally, in Grutter v. Bollinger,205 Justice O’Connor, writing for a slim
majority of the Court, found that the University of Michigan Law School had a
compelling state interest in student body diversity and, therefore, upheld its
admissions policy.206 To justify its decision, the Court relied on the position
taken by Justice Powell in Bakke that the First Amendment protects four
essential academic freedoms (including deciding who may be admitted to
study).207 Justice O’Connor argued that another reason to be bound by the
earlier opinion was that public and private universities across the nation had
relied on Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke to craft their own admissions
programs.208 The Court’s scrutiny was “no less strict,” she added, because it had
“tak[en] into account complex educational judgments in an area that lies
primarily within the expertise of the university.”209
Justice O’Connor, like Justice Stevens in Ewing, devoted some attention to
the role of the faculty as a body. She specifically mentioned that the challenged
admissions policy had been crafted by a faculty committee and that it only
became the school’s “official” admissions policy after it was approved by the
faculty.210 In deferring to the faculty’s “educational judgment” that a diverse
student body was essential to the university’s educational mission, Justice
O’Connor cited “our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university’s
academic decisions.”211 She concluded by writing that “universities occupy a
special niche in our constitutional tradition,”212 however, rather than by reaffirm-
ing that academic freedom is a “special concern of the First Amendment.”213
Whether that “special niche” depends on faculty participation in making aca-
demic decisions was not discussed.
The later academic freedom decisions thus repeatedly extended academic
freedom beyond research and teaching to cover the kinds of academic matters
embodied in the four essential freedoms. Most of the Court’s decisions, how-
ever, described academic freedom as belonging to the institution, rather than to
the faculty. Only in Ewing did the Court emphasize that its deference turned on
the fact that faculty made the challenged decision. The Court’s failure to address
204. Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 200–01; cf. Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977) (holding constitu-
tional, because they were not direct infringements of the right to marry, those sections of the Social
Security Act that specify a dependent child’s benefits terminate upon marriage to an individual not
entitled to benefits under the Act).
205. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
206. Id. at 343.
207. Id. at 329.
208. Id. at 323.
209. Id. at 328.
210. Id. at 314–15.
211. Id. at 328.
212. Id. at 329 (emphasis added).
213. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
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the governance role of faculty that is at the heart of academic freedom,
combined with its failure to justify protecting institutional academic freedom in
the absence of faculty participation, has confused both litigants and lower
courts.214
D. THE COURT AND SHARED GOVERNANCE
The Supreme Court acknowledged the value of giving faculty primary respon-
sibility for academic matters in NLRB v. Yeshiva University,215 a case not
usually considered an academic freedom decision.216 Nonetheless, four years
later the Court held that faculty do not have a constitutional right to participate
in academic governance.217
In Yeshiva, the Court held that faculty members at Yeshiva University could
not organize under the National Labor Relations Act because they are “manage-
rial employees.”218 In justifying its decision, the Court explained:
The “business” of a university is education, and its vitality ultimately must
depend on academic policies that largely are formulated and generally are
implemented by faculty governance decisions. . . .
. . . The university requires faculty participation in governance because
professional expertise is indispensable to the formulation and implementation
of academic policy.219
The Court devoted considerable attention in its opinion to the governance
structure of Yeshiva, which is typical of the shared governance of many colleges
and universities in the United States. “Ultimate authority” is vested in the Board
of Trustees.220 The President sits with the Board, and serves as chief executive
officer.221 The budget of each school is drafted by a dean and is subject to
approval by the president after consultation with a committee of administra-
tors.222 Faculty participate in university-wide governance through an elected
student-faculty council.223
214. See, e.g., Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 410 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (stating that
academic freedom “inheres in the University, not in individual professors”).
215. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
216. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 9 (providing a comprehensive survey of academic freedom
decisions of the Court that does not include Yeshiva).
217. Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984). For a discussion of Knight,
see infra notes 230–33 and accompanying text.
218. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 686.
219. Id. at 688. The dissenters agreed that faculty should have primary responsibility for academic
matters, but were concerned that lay boards nonetheless might ignore the faculty. See id. at 697–98
(Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
220. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 675.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 675–76. Most universities, by contrast, have faculty senates that are made up of faculty
only. See Kaplan, supra note 99, at 191 (referring to a 2001 survey of higher-education governance,
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Individual schools are substantially autonomous. Faculty at each school meet
formally and informally to decide a range of academic matters, both in commit-
tees and as a whole. The Court specifically found that faculty at each school at
Yeshiva “effectively determine its curriculum, grading system, admission and
matriculation standards, academic calendars, and course schedules.”224 Because
deans regard faculty actions as binding, no academic decision made by the
faculty had been vetoed in more than a dozen years.225
The faculties of the various schools make recommendations to their dean as
to faculty hiring, tenure, sabbaticals, termination, and promotion. Although the
final decision is made by the central administration on the advice of the dean,
the overwhelming majority of faculty recommendations are implemented.226
The Court compared this governance structure of higher education with that
of private industry. It found that the National Labor Relations Act was intended
to accommodate the type of management-employee relations that prevail in the
“pyramidal hierarchies of private industry,” not the “shared authority” that is
typical of higher education under which authority is divided between a central
administration and one or more faculties.227 The Court also agreed with the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) that, because of the difference in
governance, principles developed for use in the industrial setting should not be
“imposed blindly on the academic world.”228
In the years since Yeshiva, lower courts and the NLRB have struggled with
the question of whether faculties in particular colleges and universities have as
much governance authority as the faculty in Yeshiva. Their decisions reveal that,
in American higher education, there exists a continuum of governance practices
that ranges from institutions, like Yeshiva, that give faculty primary responsibil-
ity for most academic matters to institutions that treat faculty as ordinary at-will
employees with little or no role in formulating academic policy.229 A well-
which found that 72.3% of the institutions have regular meetings of the full faculty, 58.6% have faculty
senates made up of faculty only, and only 16.2% have senates composed of faculty, students, and staff).
224. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 676.
225. Id. at 676 n.4.
226. Id. at 677.
227. Id. at 680.
228. Id. at 680–81.
229. Compare, e.g., Fla. Mem’l Coll., 263 N.L.R.B. 1248, 1252–53 (1982) (holding that the faculty
in question are not managerial employees because “unlike Yeshiva, the curriculum is not within the
faculty’s absolute control, since all decisions involving course offerings must be approved by the
Academic Council, almost one-half of whose voting members are administrators, and other curricular
proposals must be approved by the dean of academic affairs or the board of trustees. . . . While the
faculty members generally determine the content of their own courses, even this basic academic
function is carried out in collaboration with the dean of academic affairs insofar as the selection of
textbooks is concerned. . . . The faculty has no effective control over admissions policy or matters
relating to the retention, suspension, probation, or expulsion of students or to graduation requirements.
. . . The faculty is also without any substantial authority with respect to such matters as hiring, tenure,
promotions, grievances, or sabbaticals. . . . There is no tenure at the College . . . [and t]he president has
unilaterally determined that the contracts of at least five faculty members would not be renewed, and he
did so in apparent disregard of the procedures set forth in the faculty handbook regarding such
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crafted jurisprudence of academic freedom should take account of this con-
tinuum.
Although the Court in Yeshiva acknowledged the value of faculty participa-
tion in governance, in Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight
it held that faculty members do not have a constitutional right to participate in
academic governance at public colleges and universities.230 Knight involved a
Minnesota statute that required public employees to bargain over the terms and
conditions of employment. The statute also required public employers to ex-
change views on subjects relating to employment but outside the scope of
mandatory bargaining solely with the exclusive representative selected by employ-
ees.231 The statute was challenged by twenty faculty members at community
colleges who wanted to talk directly with their employers about academic
matters. Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, acknowledged that there are
numerous policy arguments to support faculty participation in school gover-
nance, but concluded, nonetheless, that faculty do not have a constitutional right
to participate in policymaking in academic institutions.232
It would be an unprecedented expansion of First Amendment jurisprudence to
require all colleges and universities to adopt shared governance. Imposing a
single governance structure also would put at risk the institutional diversity that
has characterized and strengthened American higher education for nearly two
centuries.233 There is nothing in the Knight holding, however, to prevent
decisions.”), with Lewis & Clark Coll., 300 N.L.R.B. 155, 157, 161–62 (1990) (holding that the faculty
in question are managerial employees and noting that the recommendations of committees composed
predominantly of faculty members were usually followed in areas such as admissions requirements and
curriculum, and that faculty views were followed in sixty-five of sixty-seven promotion cases and
fifty-two of fifty-seven tenure decisions).
230. 465 U.S. 271, 273 (1984).
231. Id. at 274–75 (noting that under the Public Employees Labor Relations Act (PELRA), employ-
ers may neither “meet and negotiate” nor “meet and confer” with any members of their bargaining unit
except through their exclusive representatives).
232. Id. at 287. Justice Brennan in dissent argued:
If the First Amendment is truly to protect the “free play of the spirit” within our institutions of
higher learning, then the faculty at those institutions must be able to participate effectively in
the discussion of such matters as, for example, curriculum reform, degree requirements,
student affairs, new facilities, and budgetary planning. The freedom to teach without inhibi-
tion may be jeopardized just as gravely by a restriction on the faculty’s ability to speak out on
such matters as by the more direct restrictions struck down in Keyishian.
Id. at 297 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
233. See CLAUDIA GOLDIN & LAWRENCE F. KATZ, THE RACE BETWEEN EDUCATION AND TECHNOLOGY 283
(2008) (American higher education grew strong because of its diversity, competition, and decentraliza-
tion); Philip G. Altbach, The American Academic Model in Comparative Perspective, in IN DEFENSE OF
AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 1, 17 (Philip G. Altbach et al. eds., 2001) (noting that diversity is a central
organizing principle of American higher education); see also Keller, supra note 98, at 171 (“Daytona
Beach Community College with 10,000 students needs a different governance scheme than does Eckerd
College with 1,500 students, and Iowa State University should exhibit a different form of governance
from Grinnell College.”).
Private colleges and universities dominated higher education in its early years. JERGEN HERBST, FROM
CRISIS TO CRISIS: AMERICAN COLLEGE GOVERNMENT, 1636–1819, at 189–90 (1982). By 2005, however,
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expanding constitutional academic freedom to protect speech that is concerned
with academic governance—speech that I will term “academic governance
speech.”
III. TOWARD A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
A. PARTIAL CONVERGENCE OF THE PROFESSIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
The academic freedom decisions of the Supreme Court reveal that there has
been some convergence of the professional and constitutional standards over
time, at least with respect to expanding academic freedom to protect academic
governance matters, as well as research and teaching. The Court in its later
decisions embraced Frankfurter’s position in his Sweezy concurrence and ex-
tended constitutional protection to a number of academic governance matters
including admissions policy (Bakke and Grutter), student academic standards
(Ewing), and the tenure process (University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC).
This partial convergence of the professional and constitutional standards of
academic freedom reflects an ongoing conversation that has taken place be-
tween the profession and the Court—a conversation that has been assisted by
the experience of judges who were academics before being appointed to the
bench.234 The conversation got off to a fairly slow start when the AAUP decided
not to file an amicus brief in Sweezy because it was not persuaded of the
wisdom of seeking legal protection for academic freedom.235 Since Sweezy,
however, the AAUP has submitted briefs in most of the major academic
freedom decisions of the Court.
Although the two standards have converged as to the scope of academic
freedom, they continue to differ significantly in the way they address gover-
nance matters. The professional standard, which applies to private, as well as to
public, colleges and universities, allocates primary responsibility for academic
matters to the faculty. This assignment of primary responsibility over academic
matters does not give faculty exclusive control, however. Universities are
65% of the nation’s 1.29 million faculty members were at public institutions. 54 CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Aug. 31, 2007, at 25. Of the 696,660 associate degrees awarded during the 2004–2005 academic year,
79% were from public institutions, 7% from private nonprofits, and 15% from private for-profits; of the
1,439,214 bachelor degrees, 65% were from public institutions, 32% from private nonprofits, and 3%
from private for-profits. Id. at 20.
234. On the current Court, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Scalia all have been tenured faculty
members, and Justice Kennedy taught law regularly when he was on the Ninth Circuit. Important
lower-court academic freedom opinions decided by former academics include: Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216
F.3d 401, 426 (4th Cir. 2000) (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring); Feldman v. Bahn, 12 F.3d 730, 732–33 (7th
Cir. 1993) (Easterbrook, J.); and Piarowsky v. Ill. Cmty. Coll. Dist. 515, 759 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1985)
(Posner, J.).
235. Robert K. Carr, Academic Freedom, the American Association of University Professors, and the
United States Supreme Court, 45 AAUP BULL. 5, 19 (1959). The AAUP also did not think that the case
would be decided on academic freedom principles. Id.
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deliberately structured to make it difficult to earn tenure, for example, or to have
it taken away.236 Tenure normally requires a series of approvals: first at the
departmental or school level, then by a university-wide committee of faculty
from different schools and departments, then by the provost, the president and,
at some institutions, the governing board. At each stage of the process, the
decisionmakers have access to reviews of the candidate’s scholarship by schol-
ars in the same discipline both at the home and at other institutions, and reviews
of the candidate’s teaching by faculty and students. The goal of this lengthy
process of checks and balances is to ensure that candidates granted tenure meet
the highest academic standards.237 At the same time, professional academic
freedom standards limit the power that universities (and their faculties) may
exert over the academic freedom of individual faculty members once they are
tenured. Tenure is not to be revoked except for cause, and only after a hearing
before faculty peers. Faculty expression can be the basis for dismissal only if it
“clearly demonstrates the faculty member’s unfitness for his or her position.”238
Although the AAUP 1915 Declaration endorsed shared governance, it did not
address “academic governance speech.”239 The omission probably reflects that
the Declaration was written to make the general case for academic freedom, and
not as a guide for the judiciary. Some scholars have dealt with the omission by
236. A number of courts have recognized that they should give considerable deference to the
academic judgments of institutions to deny tenure, but less deference to decisions to dismiss tenured
faculty. See, e.g., Vanasco v. National-Louis Univ., 137 F.3d 962, 968 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[T]enure
decisions are often based on ‘the distinction between competent and superior achievement.’ Such
decisions necessarily rely on subjective judgments about academic potential. . . . Universities should
not be allowed to use the subjective nature of the tenure process to camouflage discrimination. . . . How-
ever, we must not second-guess the expert decisions of faculty in the absence of evidence that those
decisions mask actual but unarticulated reasons for the University’s action.” (quoting Kuhn v. Ball State
Univ., 78 F.3d 330, 331 (7th Cir. 1996))); Beitzel v. Jeffrey, 643 F.2d 870, 875 (1st Cir. 1981) (“Given
the university’s overall mission, the creation and transmission of knowledge, the very need for strong
procedural protections to prevent the wrongful dismissal of a tenured teacher concomitantly suggests a
need for wide discretion in making the initial tenure award.”).
237. See, e.g., Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 43 (2d Cir. 2000) (upholding tenure denial
in Title VII case where the provost overturned a favorable vote by a closely divided ad hoc committee
on tenure on the ground that the candidate’s scholarship did not meet university standards after
discussing the work with other scholars in the candidate’s discipline); see also supra notes 90–91 and
accompanying text (describing the lengthy one-way ratchet process recommended in the Statement on
Government).
238. 1940 Statement, supra note 75, at 6. The 1970 Interpretive Comments add: “Extramural
utterances rarely bear upon the faculty member’s fitness for his or her position. Moreover, a final
decision should take into account the faculty member’s entire record as a teacher and scholar.” Id.
239. In 2003, the AAUP Council approved a statement, On the Relationship of Faculty Governance
to Academic Freedom, which provides:
The academic freedom of faculty members includes the freedom to express their views (1) on
academic matters in the classroom and in the conduct of research, (2) on matters having to do
with their institution and its policies, and (3) on issues of public interest generally, and to do
so even if their views are in conflict with one or another received wisdom.
AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 141, 142 (10th ed. 2006) (emphasis added).
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discussing what they term “intramural” speech.240 Professor Matthew Finkin,
for example, reports that by 1957 the AAUP extended academic freedom to
intramural speech.241 He uses the term “intramural speech” primarily to mean
faculty criticism of the administration, however.242 Such criticism may have
little to do with faculty governance responsibilities, so it is not clear why it
should be protected by academic freedom. When faculty criticize the president
of their college for refusing to add a course approved by the faculty to the
curriculum, for example, they are speaking about an aspect of academic gover-
nance. When they criticize the president for his style of speaking, however, they
are not. Academic governance speech also encompasses more types of speech
than criticism of the administration including, for example, speech about the
curriculum and speech about tenure matters.
Professor David Rabban, by contrast, has advocated protecting intramural
speech if it “promotes critical inquiry.” He argues that intramural speech about
parking has such an indirect connection to research and teaching that it does not
deserve to be protected by constitutional academic freedom, although other
intramural speech does, including speech about the curriculum or administrative
abuse of the peer review process.243 His standard of “promotes critical inquiry,”
unfortunately, does not provide as clear a path for identifying which speech
should be protected as does this Article’s recommended protection for academic
governance speech.
The constitutional standard, unlike the professional standard, applies to pub-
lic colleges and universities only. Faculty at public institutions may not have a
constitutional right to participate in academic governance,244 but their speech on
academic matters such as student academic standards has been granted constitu-
tional protection by the Supreme Court.245 Lower federal courts have extended
240. See, e.g., Matthew W. Finkin, Intramural Speech, Academic Freedom, and the First Amend-
ment, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1323, 1349 (1988) (“Surely a teacher in a state college is entitled to some
academic freedom in criticizing school programs with which he is in disagreement.” (quoting with
approval State ex rel. Ball v. McPhee, 94 N.W.2d 711, 719 (Wis. 1959))); Rabban, supra note 9, at
294–97; Ailsa W. Chang, Note, Resuscitating the Constitutional “Theory” of Academic Freedom: A
Search for a Standard Beyond Pickering and Connick, 53 STAN. L. REV. 915, 945–48 (2001) (defining
“intramural speech” as “complaints about university admissions standards, grading policies, tenure
policies, peer review standards, personal treatment by colleagues and other administrative actions”).
241. Finkin, supra note 240, at 1337 n.74 (citing Academic Freedom and Tenure: Eastern Washing-
ton College of Education, 43 AAUP BULL. 225, 235 (1957) (dismissal of a faculty member for
criticizing the administration violates academic freedom)). Finkin identifies the Report on the Univer-
sity of Missouri, 8 AAUP BULL. 46, 52 (1922), as an example of AAUP recognition that academic
freedom protects intramural speech, but that report turns more on the failure to give the faculty member
involved a hearing prior to his dismissal than on expanding academic freedom to cover intramural
speech.
242. See Finkin, supra note 240, at 1336 (discussing 1915 investigation of University of Utah for
firing two faculty for “speaking in a very uncomplimentary way about the administration” and for
“speaking very disrespectfully of the Chairman of the Board of Regents”).
243. Rabban, supra note 9, at 295.
244. See Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 283 (1984).
245. See Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985).
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constitutional protection to an even broader range of academic governance
speech, including criticism of a department’s unsound teaching and administra-
tive practices,246 discussion of admissions policy and size of the student body,247
and criticism of the administration at a meeting of the faculty senate.248
The protection granted to faculty governance speech has been limited, how-
ever, by the increasing application by courts of the public-employee speech
doctrine to faculty claims. Both the Pickering balancing test and the Connick
public-concern test have been used to deny constitutional protection to faculty
governance speech.249 The Garcetti official-duty test now threatens to terminate
all constitutional protection for it, and for academic freedom generally.
A final difference between the ways the two standards address governance
matters is that the Court’s more recent decisions increasingly have declared
academic freedom to be an institutional right. When the Declaration expanded
the scope of academic freedom to apply to governance matters, it justified the
expansion as necessary to protect the academic freedom of the faculty from
intrusions by administrators and lay governing boards. The Court, on the other
hand, has failed to justify granting constitutional protection to institutional
decisions about academic matters, especially those made without faculty partici-
pation, nor has it discussed, apart from Ewing and Yeshiva, the relevance (if
any) of faculty participation in making institutional academic decisions or in
establishing institutional academic policies.
B. GOVERNMENT AS EDUCATOR
It is apparent that the Court needs a new approach to deciding academic
freedom cases, particularly those that involve internal disputes between faculty
members and their institutions. Carving out an exception for faculty to the
Garcetti official-duty test is one possible response, but one that would be hard
to defend. First, as Frederick Schauer has noted, the Court generally has resisted
drawing these sorts of distinctions between institutions when it applies the First
Amendment.250 Second, as has been shown above, academic freedom was never
246. See Mumford v. Godfried, 52 F.3d 756, 761–62 (8th Cir. 1995).
247. See Honore v. Douglas, 833 F.2d 565, 567, 569 (5th Cir. 1987).
248. See Mabey v. Regan, 537 F.2d 1036, 1050 (9th Cir. 1976); see also Powell v. Gallentine, 992
F.2d 1088, 1090–91 (10th Cir. 1993) (publications of allegations of grade fraud by an adjunct
professor); Johnson v. Lincoln Univ. of the Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 776 F.2d 443, 452
(3d Cir. 1985) (sending a letter to the university’s accreditor criticizing low academic standards);
Scallet v. Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999, 1018 (W.D. Va. 1996), (advocacy of diversity in a faculty
meeting), aff’d, 106 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 1997). But cf. Clinger v. N.M. Highlands Univ., 215 F.3d 1162,
1167 (10th Cir. 2000) (advocacy in the faculty senate of a “no confidence” vote with respect to four
members of the Board of Regents, and criticism of a proposed academic reorganization for conflicting
with faculty handbook do not pass the Connick public-concern test).
249. See supra notes 153–56 and accompanying text.
250. Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84,
106–13 (1998) (identifying three reasons for avoiding institution-specific solutions: (1) a general
preference for large categories; (2) a preference for juridical categories, rather than nonlegal ones like
libraries, the arts, and schools; and (3) a preference for principle over policy).
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justified as a benefit for faculty, but for its value to the First Amendment and to
the nation. Third, carving out an exception to Garcetti for faculty would not
resolve the deeper problems that have been uncovered with applying employee-
speech jurisprudence to faculty. Neither the Pickering balancing test nor the
Connick public-concern test, for example, takes adequate account of the distinc-
tive nature of the academic workplace. In particular, the tests ignore both the
governance responsibilities of faculty and the need for colleges and universities
to be refuges from views that are currently fashionable. The Court also needs to
clarify whether the judiciary should defer to academic decisions made by
administrators or lay boards in the absence of the kind of faculty participation
relied on in Ewing.251
The Court, on the other hand, has identified several different roles or func-
tions performed by the government and developed different constitutional
standards for them.252 The Court’s willingness to make such functional distinc-
tions suggests that the best way to resolve the problems posed by Garcetti and
other employee-speech cases to academic freedom is to focus on the role of
government-as-educator and to develop a jurisprudence for the role that is
tailored to the distinctive goals, needs, and characteristics of higher education.
We are accustomed to thinking of the government-as-sovereign, but it some-
times functions in quasi-private roles as well. The work of Professor Robert
Post in distinguishing the “governance” and the “managerial” authority of the
government is helpful in understanding this distinction.253 According to Post,
when the government is in one of its managerial roles, such as operating a
prison or a motor vehicle bureau, it may regulate the speech of its employees to
achieve the objectives of the institution; in governance of the public realm, by
contrast, the government’s ability to regulate speech is constrained by tradi-
tional First Amendment standards that, for example, prohibit most content-
based regulation.254 The government in its role as government-as-employer for
this reason may regulate employee speech far more than government-as-
sovereign may regulate the speech of citizens.
Recognition of the role of government-as-educator similarly would authorize
public colleges and universities to make academic decisions about faculty and
251. See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 9, at 566 (“Many institutions that may be tempted to plead
educational autonomy in admissions challenge cases do not use faculty at all in their processes—the
admissions decisions are being made by administrators who may lack understanding about the
educational dynamics of the university. And, in some of those universities, the administrators’ decisions
are not reviewed by the faculty after they are made, at any time, to ensure that the choices are consistent
with the best education the university can offer.” (citations omitted)).
252. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1991) (upholding limits on campaign
materials near polling places where government serves as administrator of elections); Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173, 192–200 (1991) (government-as-speaker); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822–23
(1974) (government-as-military); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 564, 568 (1968) (government-as-
employer).
253. See ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 199–267
(1995).
254. Id. at 200.
2009] 989FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
students that turn on the content of their work, decisions that government-as-
sovereign could not make. But in contrast to the Connick line of cases,
government-as-educator jurisprudence would provide protection for faculty
speech about academic matters whether or not the speech is on a subject of
concern to the general public.
1. Distinguishing Government as Educator from Government as Employer
In singling out different government roles, Post cautions that courts should
pay careful attention to the “patterns of rules that establish recognizable forms
of ‘social ordering.’”255 When the government is functioning in its role as
educator, this means courts need to take into account the ways in which the
academic workplace differs from other public workplaces.256
In typical public workplaces, the government is understandably concerned
with efficiency and employee morale.257 Universities need to be efficient as
well, of course, but their primary goals are research and teaching, not the
delivery of services to the general public. Debate that might be viewed as
disruptive in other public agencies is an accepted, and even necessary, part of
the production of new knowledge and its dissemination in classrooms.258 So,
too, employee criticism that might seem insubordinate in other public agencies
may be a necessary part of fulfilling the governance responsibilities of a faculty
member in a college or university.259
255. Id. at 1.
256. See Byrne, supra note 10, at 254 (“All too often, courts fail to recognize that universities are
fundamentally different from business corporations, government agencies, or churches. . . . Our univer-
sities require legal provisions tailored to their own goals and problems.”).
257. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
258. See Trotman v. Bd. of Trs. of Lincoln Univ., 635 F.2d 216, 218–19 (3d Cir. 1980) (“Our society
assumes, in almost all cases with good reason, that different views within the academic community will
be tested in an atmosphere of free debate. It is the dialectic process which underlies learning and
progress.”); see also Ronald Dworkin, We Need a New Interpretation of Academic Freedom, in THE
FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 181, 189 (Louis Menand ed., 1996) (“Professors and others who teach
and study in a university have an . . . uncompromising responsibility. They have a paradigmatic duty to
discover and teach what they find important and true, and this duty is not . . . subject to any qualifica-
tion about the best interests of those to whom they speak. It is an undiluted responsibility to the
truth . . . .”).
259. Cf. supra note 227 and accompanying text (distinguishing between the pyramidal hierarchies of
industry and the shared authority of universities in the context of NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S.
672, 680 (1980)). The Court has distinguished the function of universities from other public agencies in
other cases as well. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion)
(“No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train
our youth. . . . Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.”); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183,
196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“It is the special task of teachers to foster those habits of
open-mindedness and critical inquiry which alone make for responsible citizens, who, in turn, make
possible an enlightened and effective public opinion. Teachers . . . cannot carry out their noble task if
the conditions for the practice of a responsible and critical mind are denied to them. They must have the
freedom of responsible inquiry, by thought and action, into the meaning of social and economic ideas,
into the checkered history of social and economic dogma.”).
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The line between government-as-educator and government-as-employer should
not be a rigid one. Universities regularly fill both roles simultaneously by acting
as educator in their dealings with faculty and students, and as employer with
staff. On nonacademic matters, such as parking or benefits policy, even a
university’s relationship with faculty is that of employer and employee because
academic matters are not involved.
Another reason to distinguish the role of government-as-educator from govern-
ment-as-employer is that faculty at public institutions of higher education must
be protected from state censorship if they are to fulfill their mission of critical
inquiry into the functioning of other parts of the government. Most government
agencies, by contrast, are expected to be responsive to the directives of both the
executive and legislative branches rather than shielded from those directives.
Protection of the decentralized nature of higher education is yet another
reason to recognize the role of government-as-educator. In The Dartmouth
College Case,260 the Court, itself, played a crucial role in preserving the
institutional diversity and decentralization that characterize American higher
education when it protected private colleges and universities from being taken
over by the states.261 Affirming constitutional protection for academic freedom
by recognizing the role of government-as-educator would support the decentral-
ized nature and consequent competition that have strengthened American higher
education.262
2. Distinguishing Government as Educator from Government as Speaker
The role of government-as-educator should be distinguished also from the
role of government-as-speaker, a role that was first recognized by the Court in
Rust v. Sullivan.263 In the course of upholding the right of the government to
prohibit physicians in family-planning programs funded by the government
from counseling patients about abortion, the Court in Rust held that the free-
speech rights of the physicians were not unconstitutionally abridged because
they remained free to pursue abortion-related speech when they were not acting
under the auspices of the federally funded project.264 The government was not
engaging in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination, according to the Court,
it was simply choosing to fund one program rather than another.265
Again, the academic workplace is different. The job of faculty is to produce
260. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward (The Dartmouth College Case), 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518
(1819).
261. See id. at 654 (holding that New Hampshire legislative acts that took over control of Dartmouth
College violated the no-impairment-of-contracts provision of the Constitution).
262. See GOLDIN & KATZ, supra note 233, at 283 (“[T]he true hallmarks of the American higher
education system relative to its counterparts in other nations have been its decentralized control, the
enormous competition between and within the public and private sectors, and its laissez faire orienta-
tion.”).
263. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
264. Id. at 198–99.
265. Id. at 194.
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and disseminate new knowledge and to encourage critical thinking, not to
indoctrinate students with ideas selected by the government.266 In Rust, for this
reason, the Court itself specifically limited the applicability of the doctrine of
government-as-speaker to universities.267
Creating an exception to Rust for universities is further supported by the
decision in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,268 where the Court struck down a
federal statute that prohibited legal services attorneys from representing clients
in any effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing welfare law. The Court
justified its decision to create an exception to Rust for legal services attorneys in
part by noting that the challenged restriction of the role of attorneys would alter
the traditional role of attorneys and thereby distort the legal system.269 So, too,
restricting faculty to promote governmental messages would alter their tradi-
tional role and distort public higher education.
3. Distinguishing Government as Educator from Government as Sovereign
The role of government-as-educator also should be distinguished from govern-
ment-as-sovereign.270 Government-as-sovereign generally may not use content-
based restrictions when regulating the speech of citizens.271 Colleges and
universities, by contrast, regularly act on the basis of the content of the speech
of faculty—and of students. Student papers are judged on the quality of their
content, for example, and students are dismissed if their work does not meet the
academic standards of their college or university. Faculty expressions are
evaluated as well; faculty are hired, promoted, and tenured (or not) based on the
quality of content of their teaching and writing. As Justice Stevens noted in
266. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 9, at 964 (“Universities serve a different function than any other
governmental institution or any other governmental employer. . . . They are created as institutions of
both teaching and research, which advance social interest in producing educated citizens and increasing
understanding across multiple academic disciplines. . . . [U]niversities encourage and develop critical
thinking processes in their students and the ability to challenge accepted wisdom, which leads not only
to a better educated citizenry but also meaningfully facilitates self-governance in a democratic society.”
(citations omitted)).
Even Lawrence Rosenthal has acknowledged that “Garcetti involved speech made by public employ-
ees acting as agents of the government. It is far from clear that scholarly work can be described in a
similar fashion.” Rosenthal, supra note 9, at 97 (arguing that managerial control over public-employee
speech is essential).
267. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 199–200 (“This is not to suggest that funding by the Government, even
when coupled with the freedom of the fund recipients to speak outside the scope of the Government-
funded project, is invariably sufficient to justify Government control over the content of expres-
sion. . . . [W]e have recognized that the university is a traditional sphere of free expression so
fundamental to the functioning of our society that the Government’s ability to control speech within
that sphere by means of conditions attached to the expenditure of Government funds is restricted by the
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the First Amendment . . . .” (internal citations omitted)).
268. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
269. Id. at 544.
270. Cf., e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 395 (1987) (“[T]he government’s power as an
employer to make hiring and firing decisions on the basis of what its employees and prospective
employees say has a much greater scope than its power to regulate expression by the general public.”).
271. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995).
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Widmar v. Vincent:272
In performing their learning and teaching missions, the managers of a univer-
sity routinely make countless decisions based on the content of communica-
tive materials. They select books for inclusion in the library, they hire
professors on the basis of their academic philosophies, they select courses for
inclusion in the curriculum, and they reward scholars for what they have
written.273
Moreover, in making decisions on the basis of the content of the expression
of faculty and students, universities—unlike government in its role of govern-
ment-as-sovereign—regularly decide some expressions are superior to others.
University decisions cannot be “viewpoint neutral” if they are to fulfill their
missions of teaching and research. Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens
and Breyer, recognized this special function of institutions of higher education
in his concurrence in Regents of the University of Wisconsin v. Southworth:274
[In a university] students are inevitably required to support the expression of
personally offensive viewpoints in ways that cannot be thought constitution-
ally objectionable unless one is prepared to deny the University its choice
over what to teach. No one disputes that some fraction of students’ tuition
payments may be used for course offerings that are ideologically offensive to
some students, and for paying professors who say things in the university
forum that are radically at odds with the politics of particular students. Least
of all does anyone claim that the University is somehow required to offer a
spectrum of courses to satisfy a viewpoint neutrality requirement. The Univer-
sity need not provide junior years abroad in North Korea as well as France,
instruct in the theory of plutocracy as well as democracy, or teach Nietzsche
as well as St. Thomas.275
272. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
273. Id. at 278–79 (Stevens, J., concurring). Judge Frank Easterbrook made a similar observation in
Feldman v. Bahn, 12 F.3d 730, 732–33 (7th Cir. 1993):
Teachers . . . speak and write for a living and are eager to protect both public and private
interests in freedom to stake out controversial positions. Yet they also evaluate speech for a
living and are eager to protect both public and private interests in the ability to judge the
speech of others and react adversely to some. They grade their students’ papers and perfor-
mance in class. They edit journals, which reject scholarly papers of poor quality. They
evaluate their colleagues’ academic writing, and they deny continuing employment to profes-
sors whose speech does not meet their institution’s standards of quality. “The government” as
an abstraction could not penalize any citizen for misunderstanding the views of Karl Marx or
misrepresenting the political philosophy of James Madison, but a Department of Political
Science can and should show such a person the door. . . . Every university evaluates and acts
on the basis of speech by members of the faculty. . . .
274. 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
275. Id. at 242–43.
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C. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GOVERNMENT AS EDUCATOR
When the government is in its role as educator, and it faces an external threat
to academic freedom, normally there will be no need to examine the governance
structure of a university. Cases like Wieman, Sweezy, and Keyishian thus would
be decided in the same way. When the threat to academic freedom is internal,
however, the doctrine of government-as-educator, in contrast to the public-
employee speech doctrine of government-as-employer, would provide First
Amendment protection for the speech of individual faculty members as long as
the speech concerned research, teaching, or faculty governance matters. Speech
that met this “academic matters” test would not need to satisfy either the
Connick public-concern test or the Pickering balancing test. Academic speech
could be limited, however, by the same sort of reasonable time, place, and
manner limitations that may be used to limit citizen speech under the First
Amendment.276
Justice Rehnquist, in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
Doyle,277 established a causation test for First Amendment challenges brought
by public employees that also can serve as a guide in challenges brought by
faculty against a college or university pursuant to the doctrine of government-as-
educator. Under Mt. Healthy, a plaintiff challenging an employer’s disciplinary
action, taken in response to statements by the plaintiff, has the initial burden of
establishing that the contested expression was constitutionally protected and
that it was the reason for the challenged employer action.278 In a government-as-
educator case, a faculty member first would have to show that his or her
expression met the academic-matter test—that is, that the speech was concerned
with research, teaching, or academic governance matters. If the faculty-plaintiff
fails to meet this burden, then the jurisprudence of government-as-employer
should be followed. In a case like Smith v. Kent State University,279 for
276. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“[T]he government may
impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the
restrictions ‘are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels
for communication of the information.’” (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288, 293 (1984))); Piarowsky v. Ill. Cmty. Coll. Dist. 515, 759 F.2d 625, 630 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding
that internal disputes over academic freedom may be resolved on the ground that the institution’s
limitations were reasonable).
277. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
278. Id. at 287.
279. 696 F.2d 476 (6th Cir. 1983). Smith refused to teach a course assigned to him after he received
an unfavorable rating for his teaching of a basic course in his field. A committee of peer faculty
approved assigning him to teach the course, but recommended against dismissal as too severe a
sanction. The following year when Smith was again assigned the course, he advised at the last minute
that he would not teach it, and that he would appeal the assignment. Smith’s lawyer agreed that Smith
would teach the class during the appeal, but Smith again failed to appear. After notice and a hearing,
Smith was terminated by a vote of a faculty committee. Id. at 477–78; see also Stastny v. Bd. of Trs. of
Cent. Wash. Univ., 647 P.2d 496 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (upholding the termination of a tenured
associate professor who repeatedly failed to teach classes).
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example, where a faculty member refused to teach his assigned course, his
actions would not be constitutionally protected. Once a faculty member estab-
lished that his or her expression was protected because it concerned an aca-
demic matter, however, and that the protected expression was the basis for the
challenged disciplinary action by the university then, as in Mt. Healthy, the
burden of justifying the discipline or dismissal action would shift to the
university.
Under the government-as-educator doctrine, if a university shows that its
disciplinary decision was supported by the faculty (or by an authorized commit-
tee of the faculty), a court should presume that the decision was made on
academic grounds and defer to it. This presumption would not only be logical, it
would have the additional benefit of limiting judicial intrusion into the internal
processes of most colleges and universities. Judges are public officials, of
course, so they should avoid infringing the academic freedom of academic
institutions unless their intervention is necessary to protect the academic free-
dom of faculty.
An individual faculty-plaintiff could challenge a decision made by the fac-
ulty, but the bar would be set extremely high. Following Ewing, courts should
defer to an academic decision made by the faculty as a body (or a standing
committee of the faculty) unless the plaintiff is able to show that the decision
was “such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demon-
strate that the faculty did not exercise its professional judgment.”280
If the administration or governing board did not consult with the faculty
through established channels,281 however, or if it overturned a decision made by
the faculty, courts may need to intervene. The Supreme Court, unfortunately,
has never specified what test should be used to evaluate the actions of an
institution of higher education in the absence of faculty participation.
Fortunately, a viable standard is set forth in the same opinion that first
endorsed the expanded conception of academic freedom—Justice Frankfurter’s
concurrence in Sweezy. The conference quotation he selected provides that, in
exercising the four essential freedoms, a university should make determinations
“for itself on academic grounds.”282 Frankfurter’s opinion does not define
“academic grounds” but, by custom, the phrase means evaluating students and
faculty on the basis of the quality of their work, not by their social position or
institutional importance. Core academic policies, such as what courses will be
offered in the curriculum and the requirements for earning a degree, also are to
be formulated on the basis of their academic merit, not the position of their
proponent.283 When a faculty makes an academic decision, it is reasonable for a
280. See Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985).
281. A board should not be able to select the most compliant faculty.
282. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (emphasis added).
283. See supra notes 70–74 and accompanying text. A recent violation of the custom occurred at
West Virginia University (WVU). In April 2008, the provost and the dean of the business school
resigned their administrative positions after the report of an independent panel found that they had
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court to assume that the decision was made on academic grounds. When the
administration or governing board makes a decision without consulting faculty,
or rejects a faculty recommendation, however, they must bear the burden of
proving that the decision was made on academic grounds.
A lay governing board is likely to find it difficult to make academic decisions
“on academic grounds” without consulting experienced faculty members be-
cause most trustees are not scholars—and, indeed, should not be. They are
selected to bring to the board important but different talents, expertise, and
experience from those of professional scholars. They have not had the pro-
longed and specialized technical training of academics,284 nor are they experi-
enced teachers or scholars. A prudent governing board, therefore, normally will
involve scholars at appropriate points in its decisional processes, just as the
Committee of Eight provided for the involvement of peer review at key points
in Harvard’s tenure process.285
There will be instances, nonetheless, when a responsible governing board (or
its appointed administration) should overrule a decision of the faculty. The
Statement on Government, for example, acknowledges that departments some-
times need to be reformed.286 Professor David Rabban gives the example of a
university administrator who, out of concern that the philosophy department has
no expert on Plato and Aristotle, denies tenure to a philosopher with another
specialty despite the fact that the philosopher’s department recommended ten-
ure.287 This kind of administrative concern with departmental balance is one
that even the AAUP accepts as appropriate.288 The constitutional value of using
“academic grounds” as the standard for evaluating university decisions has been
acknowledged by the government, moreover, in its brief in University of
Pennsylvania v. EEOC.289
Courts should defer to a decision made by an institution of higher education
if the institution can show that it was made on academic grounds.290 A decision
improperly granted a degree to the daughter of the governor, who had not completed the necessary
coursework. On May 5, 2008, the faculty senate passed a resolution of no-confidence in the president
and asked that he resign as well. Robin Shulman, WVU President Clings to Job After Faculty Vote,
WASH. POST, May 8, 2008, at A2. On June 6, 2008, Mike Garrison, the president of WVU, announced
that he would step down in September. Paul Fain, Questions Follow a Political President’s Fall, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., June 20, 2008, at A11.
284. See 1915 Declaration, supra note 12, at 865.
285. See supra note 104.
286. See Statement on Government, supra note 83, at 138 (“The president must at times, with or
without support, infuse new life into a department . . . .”).
287. Rabban, supra note 9, at 286.
288. Id.
289. Brief for the Respondent at 29, Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990) (No. 88-493)
(“Where a university is alleged to have infringed an individual’s rights, it can invoke legitimate
academic considerations to justify its actions, but it has no ‘constitutional shield.’”).
290. Cf. Rabban, supra note 9, at 283–87 (disagreeing with Byrne’s opposition to judicial review of
internal university disputes and noting that a good model for judicial review exists in cases in which
faculty claim that universities have violated Title VII prohibitions on employment discrimination or the
First Amendment).
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made by the administration or board should not be granted judicial deference,
however, if it was based on mere disagreement with the expression of a faculty
member.291
The jurisprudence of government-as-educator also should take into account
the most effective institutional use of the faculties as to academic matters.
Generally, faculties are best used to establish policy on academic matters such
as curriculum and admissions, not to make every decision applying the policy.
Administrators are appropriately delegated authority, for example, to decide at
what times and in what classrooms courses approved by the faculty will be
taught, and to evaluate admissions applications according to a policy established
by the faculty. Those administration decisions should be entitled to judicial
deference as long as they are consistent with faculty-approved policies.
The proposed jurisprudence for government-as-educator would not make
faculty participation in governance a constitutional requirement, but it would
protect speech arising from the governance roles of faculty as well as from their
research or teaching. Colleges and universities would remain free to decide
whether and how much to involve faculty in making academic decisions. If
faculty were not consulted about a particular academic decision that was later
challenged in court, the institution would have the burden of showing that the
challenged decision was made on academic grounds.
A good illustration of how the doctrine of government-as-educator would
function can be seen by applying it to the facts of Hong v. Grant.292 Juan Hong
is a professor in the Department of Chemical Engineering and Materials Science
at the University of California, Irvine.293 He sued the administrators of his
university for denying him a merit salary increase, and alleged that the denial
was in retaliation for his criticism of the hiring and promotion of other faculty,
and of the Department’s use of too many lecturers.294 The court acknowledged
that in the University of California system, a faculty member’s duties include a
variety of governance matters:
In the University of California system, a faculty member’s official duties are
not limited to classroom instruction and professional research. . . . [T]hey also
include a wide range of academic, administrative and personnel functions in
accordance with UCI’s self-governance principle. As an active participant in
his institution’s self-governance, Mr. Hong has a professional responsibility to
291. See, e.g., Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973) (overturning decision by the university
president to refuse to support tenure because of candidate’s “anti-administration” attitude, despite
affirmative vote by faculty); cf. Chen, supra note 9, at 972 (“[I]t is not clear why courts ought to trust
academic administrators, many of whom are subject to the same political pressures (public and private)
as other public officials, particularly where something as vital as speech is concerned.”).
292. 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
293. Id. at 1161.
294. Id. at 1164.
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offer feedback, advice and criticism about his department’s administration and
operation from his perspective as a tenured, experienced professor.295
After finding that Hong’s speech was made pursuant to his “official duties” as
a faculty member,296 the court, citing Garcetti, held that his speech therefore
was not constitutionally protected, and granted summary judgment to the
university.297 The court also held that Hong’s speech was not of public signifi-
cance, and thus it failed the Connick public-concern test as well.298
If Hong were decided under the government-as-educator standard, Hong
would have the initial burden of showing that his speech met the academic-
matter test and, therefore, was protected, and that his speech was the reason he
was denied the merit increase. Assuming Hong met this intial burden, the
burden going forward would shift to the university to show either that the denial
of the merit increase was based on a policy approved by the faculty or, in the
alternative, that it had been made on academic grounds and not in retaliation for
Hong’s protected speech. His speech would not be subjected to the Pickering
balancing test, the Connick public-concern test, or the Garcetti official-duty test.
Conditioning judicial deference on whether a challenged university decision
was made on academic grounds is a much better way to resolve internal
disputes than a presumption that the institution should prevail.299 Moreover, the
academic-matter test that would be central to the jurisprudence of government-
as-educator better fits the nature of the academic workplace than either the
Pickering balancing test, which turns on the extent to which the speech was
disruptive, or the Connick test of whether the speech was on a matter of public
concern.
Adopting a jurisprudence tailored to the distinctive role of government-as-
educator also will enable the Court to maintain its longstanding recognition of
the importance of higher education to the nation. As Justice Frankfurter ob-
served in Wieman, education is “the basis of hope for the perdurance of our
democracy” because it fosters “those habits of open-mindedness and critical
inquiry which alone make for responsible citizens, who, in turn, make possible
an enlightened . . . public opinion.”300 Higher education contributes much more
295. Id. at 1166–67 (internal citations omitted).
296. Id. at 1168.
297. Id. at 1168, 1170. The Seventh Circuit also has relied on Garcetti to deny constitutional
protection to speech by a faculty member about a university’s use of his grant funds. See Renken v.
Gregory, 541 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2008).
298. Hong, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 1169.
299. Byrne, for example, advocates “a very limited role in protecting faculty against their schools.”
Byrne, supra note 10, at 255. However, he did qualify his position somewhat by later adding that
“constitutional academic freedom ought not to protect institutions resembling universities but which . . .
recognize no role for faculty in governance.” Id. at 338.
300. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also George
Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATES PAPERS: SPEECHES AND
MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES TO BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS 34, 36 (1833)
(“Promote, then, as an object of primary importance, institutions for the general diffusion of knowl-
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to the nation, moreover, than educated citizens. It is also a prime source of new
ideas, which, from the earliest days of the republic, have stimulated the economy,
strengthened national security, enhanced culture, and enriched civic life.
CONCLUSION
Most legal scholars have overlooked the governance dimension of academic
freedom. When the modern concept of academic freedom as protection for the
freedom of individual faculty members to inquire and to teach was transplanted
to the United States, the drafters of the seminal 1915 AAUP Declaration of
Academic Freedom faced the problem that American colleges and universities,
unlike their European counterparts, were run by lay governing boards, not
faculties. Their solution, which has been carried forward in later professional
statements, was to expand academic freedom to protect faculty from intrusions
by governing boards (or the administrators they appoint). To this end, the
Declaration allocates faculties primary—although not exclusive—responsibility
for such academic matters as the curriculum, student academic standards, and
granting (or denying) tenure. Faculty at both private and public colleges and
universities thus have a professional obligation to oversee core academic mat-
ters in their institutions, in addition to their research and teaching. The Declara-
tion also provides that, in the event of a conflict over a core academic matter,
the judgment of the faculty as a body trumps that of individual faculty mem-
bers.
The Supreme Court extended First Amendment protection to the academic
freedom of faculty members at public colleges and universities in the 1950s. In
1968, however, the Court began to use public-employee speech jurisprudence to
decide faculty-speech cases. That change reduced the amount of constitutional
protection provided for academic freedom. The Garcetti holding that speech
made pursuant to a public employee’s “official duties” is not protected, now
threatens to end all constitutional protection for the academic freedom of faculty
at public colleges and universities.
Academic freedom was never defended as a benefit for faculty, but for its
value to the First Amendment and to the nation. There is little justification,
therefore, for carving out an exception for faculty to the Garcetti “official duty”
test. Such an exception also would fail to resolve the deeper constitutional
problem that neither the Pickering balancing test, nor the Connick public-
concern test, adequately accounts for the distinctive nature of the academic
workplace, including the governance responsibilities of the faculty. As the Court
itself has acknowledged in Yeshiva, the academic workplace is different from
most public workplaces.
A better judicial approach is to recognize that the function or role of
edge. In proportion as the structure of government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that
public opinion should be enlightened.”).
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government-as-educator is different from the role of government-as-employer
or government-as-speaker, and to develop an appropriate jurisprudence for it.
Under the doctrine of government-as-educator, the First Amendment would not
limit the ability of public colleges and universities to make judgments about
faculty and students on the basis of the content of their speech. When faculty
members challenge a university decision to discipline or dismiss them, follow-
ing Mt. Healthy, they would have the burden of showing that their speech was
constitutionally protected and that it was the reason for the discipline or
dismissal. If the university demonstrates that the faculty (or a duly constituted
committee of the faculty) agreed with the institutional decision, courts should
presume that the matter was decided on academic grounds and defer to it. If the
faculty were not consulted, however, or if the board or administration overruled
the faculty, then the institution would bear the burden of showing that its
decision was made on academic grounds.
The Supreme Court will face a choice. It can extend the holding of Garcetti
to faculty at public colleges and universities, and thereby effectively eliminate
constitutional protection for their scholarship, teaching, and governance activi-
ties. That result would ignore more than fifty years of constitutional protection
of academic freedom. It also risks seriously undermining the intellectual vigor
and, therefore, the academic quality, of our public colleges and universities and,
indirectly, of all of higher education. It probably would lead to reduced competi-
tion between public and private institutions of higher education, a competition
that has helped to produce our extraordinarily successful higher-education
sector. Alternatively, the Court can recognize the role of government-as-
educator, and develop a jurisprudence that takes appropriate account of the
special characteristics of the academic workplace and the importance of higher
education to the nation.
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